Kādas simpātijas slēpās ASV jūras spēkiem ap Amerikas pilsoņu karu?

Kādas simpātijas slēpās ASV jūras spēkiem ap Amerikas pilsoņu karu?


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Apmēram Amerikas pilsoņu kara laikā sauszemes militārpersonām (tas ir, armijai) bija simpātijas par Konfederācijas lietu, manuprāt, tā laika militāro virsnieku sastāvā galvenokārt bija Amerikas dienvidi. Daudzi vadītāji un militārie komandieri bija no dienvidu štatiem, un viņu simpātijas bija vērstas pret viņu mītnes zemēm. Aptuveni tajā pašā laikā ASV Jūras spēkiem bija jābūt virsnieku kodolam, kas vairākumā no kaut kurienes ieradās, bet es neesmu redzējis nevienu rakstisku materiālu, kas to būtu izpētījis.

Kāds bija ASV kara flotes sastāvs šajā laikā? Vai viņi bija vairākumā no ziemeļu štatiem, kuriem jau bija jūras kultūra? Piešķirts, ka ASV Jūras spēki šajā laikā bija salīdzinoši mazi, bet šiem cilvēkiem bija jānāk no kaut kurienes, un es esmu ieinteresēts zināt, kur noteikt, kur izmērīt viņu simpātijas.


Atšķirībā no armijas, kur no dienvidiem ieradās nesamērīgi daudz virsnieku, ASV flotē diezgan daudz dominēja ziemeļi. Viens pierādījums tam bija fakts, ka flote Norfolkā, Virdžīnijā, tika pārvarēta ar tās jūrniekiem, lai novērstu iekļūšanu dienvidu rokās. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Monitor

Galvenais iemesls, kāpēc Savienības blokāde bija veiksmīga, bija tas, ka gandrīz visi kuģi (izņemot ievērojamo dzelzs Merrimac, kas pārdēvēts par Virdžīniju) palika Savienībā.


10 lietas, kuras jūs, iespējams, nezināt par Meksikas un Amerikas karu

1. Pirms iebrukuma Meksikā ASV mēģināja nopirkt daļu no savas teritorijas.
1845. gada beigās prezidents Džeimss K. Polks nosūtīja diplomātu Džonu Slideļu slepenā misijā uz Meksiku. Slidelam tika uzdots atrisināt ilgstošas ​​domstarpības par abu valstu robežu, taču viņš arī tika pilnvarots piedāvāt meksikāņiem līdz 25 miljoniem ASV dolāru par viņu teritorijām Ņūmeksikā un Kalifornijā.  

Kad meksikāņi atteicās izskatīt piedāvājumu, Polks palielināja iepriekšējo rīcību, pavēlot 4000 karavīru Zakarija Teilora vadībā ieņemt zemi starp Nueces upi un Rio Grande un Meksikas reģionu, ko pieprasīja kā savu teritoriju. Meksika atbildēja, nosūtot karaspēku uz strīdīgo zonu, un 1846. gada 25. aprīlī viņu kavalērija uzbruka amerikāņu dragūnu patruļai. Polka pretinieki vēlāk iebildīs, ka prezidents ir cīnījies ar meksikāņiem.  

Neskatoties uz to, 1846. gada 13. maijā Kongress nobalsoja par kara pasludināšanu Meksikai ar milzīgu pārsvaru.

2. Karš iezīmēja vairāku topošo pilsoņu kara ģenerāļu cīņas debiju.
Kopā ar nākamajiem prezidentiem Zahariju Teiloru un Franklinu Pīrsu ASV spēki Meksikā iekļāva daudzus virsniekus, kuri vēlāk savu vārdu ieguva pilsoņu kara kaujas laukos.  

Kalpoja arodbiedrības ģenerāļi Uliss S. Grants, Džordžs Mīds un Džordžs Makkellalans, tāpat kā daudzi viņu konfederācijas pretinieki, piemēram, Roberts E. Lī, Stounvals Džeksons un Džordžs Pikets. Lī, kurš tolaik bija armijas inženieru korpusa kapteinis, izgāja no kara par varoni pēc tam, kad bija izpētījis piespēles, kas ļāva amerikāņiem pārspēt meksikāņus Cerro Gordo un Kontreras cīņās.

3. Santa Anna izmantoja karu, lai atgūtu varu Meksikā.
Lielākā daļa amerikāņu uzskatīja Antonio Lopesu de Santu Annu par mirstīgu ienaidnieku par savu rīcību 1836. gada#Alamo kaujā, bet harizmātiskais ģenerālis atgriezās pie varas Meksikas un Amerikas kara laikā, pateicoties pārsteidzošam sabiedrotajam: Džeimsam K. Polkam.  

Kad sākās karš, Santa Anna slimoja Kubā, jo tika padzīta trimdā pēc Meksikas un#x2019 diktatūras. 1846. gada augustā viņš pārliecināja Polkas administrāciju, ka viņš veiks sarunas par labvēlīgu mieru, ja viņam ļaus atgriezties mājās caur amerikāņu jūras blokādi. Polks uzklausīja ģenerāli, bet neilgi pēc tam, kad bija spēris kāju uz Meksikas zemes, Santa Anna divreiz šķērsoja amerikāņus un organizēja karaspēku, lai cīnītos pret iebrukumu. Līdz ar prezidenta amata atgūšanu viņš turpināja vadīt meksikāņus gandrīz visu galveno kara un#x2019 cīņu laikā.

4. Ābrahams Linkolns bija viens no kara ’s skarbākajiem kritiķiem.
Iebrukums Meksikā bija viens no pirmajiem ASV konfliktiem, kas izraisīja plašu pretkara kustību. Politiskie pretinieki tika apzīmēti ar “Mr. Polk ’s War ” ir nekaunīga zemes sagrābšana, turpretī abolicionisti uzskatīja, ka tā ir shēma, lai Savienībai pievienotu vairāk verdzības valstu. Ievērojamāko kritiķu vidū bija pirmkursnieks Ilinoisas kongresmenis Ābrahams Linkolns, kurš 1847. gadā pārgāja pie parlamenta un iepazīstināja ar virkni rezolūciju, pieprasot zināt vietu, kur atradās augsnes plankums un kur notika pirmā sadursme.  

Linkolns apgalvoja, ka cīņa ir izprovocēta uz Meksikas zemes, un viņš Polku nodēvēja par gļēvu militārās godības meklētāju. sabojāja arī savu reputāciju ar saviem kara atbalstītājiem. Viena Ilinoisas avīze pat iezīmēja viņu ar zīmolu -#rajona Benedikts Arnolds. ”

5. Tas ietvēra ASV militāro un pirmo lielo amfībijas uzbrukumu.
Nozīmīgākais Meksikas un Amerikas kara posms sākās 1847. gada martā, kad ģenerālis Vinfilds Skots no jūras iebruka Meksikas pilsētā Verakrusā. Līdz Otrajam pasaules karam, kas bija Amerika un#x2019 lielākā amfībijas operācija, Jūras spēki izmantoja speciāli izgatavotas sērfošanas laivas, lai tikai piecu stundu laikā nogādātu pludmalē vairāk nekā 10 000 ASV karavīru. Nolaišanās lielākoties nebija pretrunā ar pilsētas garnizona pārsvaru, kas vēlāk padevās pēc artilērijas bombardēšanas un 20 dienu aplenkuma. Nodrošinājis Verakrusu, Skota armija uzsāka kara pēdējos vilcienus: sešu mēnešu, 265 jūdžu kaujas gājienu uz Montezumas un#x201D zālēm Mehiko.

6. Īru katoļu grupa pameta ASV un cīnījās par Meksiku.
Viena no kara augstākajām vienībām bija Svētā Patrika bataljons, ASV karavīru grupa, kas pameta armiju un nodeva savu lomu Meksikai. 200 vīriešu apģērbu pārsvarā veidoja īru katoļi un citi imigranti, kuri apvainoja aizspriedumus, ar kuriem viņi saskārās ASV protestantos.  

Īru vārdā Džons Railijs vadīja “San Patricios ” no vietas un kļuva par Santa Annas elites artilērijas spēku. Viņi ar izcilību kalpoja Buena Vista un Cerro Gordo cīņās, bet lielākā daļa viņu vienības vēlāk tika nogalināti vai sagūstīti 1847. gada augusta sadursmes laikā pie Čurubusko. Pēc kara tiesas ASV armija pakarot izpildīja nāvessodu aptuveni 50 karavīriem. Vairāki citi tika saputoti un apzīmēti ar 𠇍 ” priekš �serter. ” Lai gan Amerikas Savienotajās Valstīs tie tika nicināti, San Patricios kļuva par nacionālajiem varoņiem Meksikā, kur viņi joprojām tiek godināti katru Svētā Patrika dienu.

7. Čapultepecas kauja radīja slavenu leģendu Meksikā.
Ierodoties Meksikā 1847. gada septembrī, ASV spēki atrada rietumu ceļu uz galvaspilsētu, ko bloķēja Čapultepecas pils - iespaidīgs cietoksnis, kurā atradās Meksikas un#x2019 militārā akadēmija. Ģenerālis Skots pavēlēja bombardēt artilēriju, un 13. septembrī viņa karaspēks iebruka citadelē un ar kāpnēm mēroja tās akmens fa 󧫞. Lielākā daļa meksikāņu aizstāvju drīz vien atkāpās, bet sešu pusaudžu militāro kadetu grupa palika savās vietās un cīnījās līdz pēdējam.  

Saskaņā ar kaujas lauka vēsturi, viens kadets neļāva sagūstīt Meksikas karogu, aptinot to ap ķermeni un lēkājot līdz nāvei no pils mūriem. Kamēr Chapultepec tika pazaudēts, meksikāņi sešus jaunos studentus nosauca par “Ni ños varoņiem, ” vai ȁHero bērniem. ” Vēlāk viņus pagodināja ar lielu pieminekli Mehiko.

8. Amerikāņu diplomāts nepaklausīja pavēlēm izbeigt karu.
Karam tuvojoties noslēgumam 1847. gadā, prezidents Polks nosūtīja Valsts departamenta ierēdni Nikolaju P. Tristu uz dienvidiem no robežas, lai noslēgtu miera līgumu ar meksikāņiem. Sākumā sarunas noritēja lēni, un 1847. gada novembrī Polks kļuva neapmierināts un lika Tristam pārtraukt sarunas un atgriezties mājās. Trist tomēr neko tādu nedarītu. Uzskatot, ka viņš atrodas uz izrāviena robežas ar meksikāņiem, viņš nepaklausīja prezidenta rīkojumam un tā vietā uzrakstīja 65 lappušu garu vēstuli, aizstāvot savu lēmumu turpināt miera centienus. Polks palika nemierīgs. Viņš sauca Tristu par goda vai principa aizstājēju un mēģināja viņu izraidīt no ASV armijas štāba, taču viņš nevarēja pārtraukt sarunas.  

1848. gada 2. februārī Trist noslēdza Gvadelupes Hidalgo līgumu - principiālu vienošanos par kara izbeigšanu. Kamēr Polks negribīgi pieņēma darījumu, viņš atlaida  Trist ਊs, tiklīdz negodīgais diplomāts atgriezās ASV.

9. Karš samazināja Meksikas lielumu par vairāk nekā pusi.
Līdz ar visu prasību atteikšanos no Teksasas Gvadalupes Hidalgo līgums arī piespieda Meksiku pieņemt 15 miljonu ASV dolāru lielu maksājumu par 525 000 kvadrātjūdzēm no tās teritorijas un#x2014a zemes gabala, kas ir lielāks par Peru lielumu. Meksikas cedētās zemes vēlāk aptvers visu nākamo Kalifornijas, Ņūmeksikas, Nevadas, Jūtas, Arizonas, Kolorādo, Vaiomingas, Oklahomas un Kanzasas štatus vai daļu no tiem.


Citāti no pilsoņu kara

"Karš ir nežēlība. Nav jēgas mēģināt to reformēt. Jo nežēlīgāks tas ir, jo ātrāk tas beigsies."

Viljams Tecumseh Sherman

" Karš nozīmē cīņu, bet cīņa - nogalināšanu."

- Nathan Bedford Forrest

"Gandrīz visi vīrieši var izturēt grūtības, bet, ja vēlaties pārbaudīt vīrieša raksturu, dodiet viņam spēku."

"Šķērsosim upi un atpūtīsimies koku ēnā."

- Pēdējie vārdi Tomass “Akmens” Džeksons

"Es ienīstu avīžniekus. Viņi ierodas nometnē un paņem baumas par nometni un izdrukā tos kā faktus. Es uzskatu viņus par spiegiem, kas patiesībā ir. Ja es viņus visus nogalinātu, pirms brokastīm būtu ziņas no elles."

- Viljams Tecumseh Sherman

"Ģenerālis Lī, šī nav jums piemērota vieta. Šie vīrieši aiz jums ir gruzīni un virdžīnieši. Viņi tevi nekad nav pievīluši un nepievils. Vai jūs, puiši?  "

"Mani plāni ir perfekti, un, kad es sāku tos īstenot, lai Dievs apžēlojas par Bobiju Lī, jo man to nebūs."

"Cīņa" Džo Hūks (pa kreisi)

"Es tikko izlasīju jūsu vēstuli par zirgiem ar sāpēm un nogurumu. Vai jūs man piedodat, ka jautāju, ko jūsu armijas zirgi ir darījuši kopš Antietamas kaujas, kas visu nogurdina?  "

Ābrahams Linkolns atbildot ģenerālim Makkallanam.

"Savienībai, kuru var uzturēt tikai ar zobeniem un bajonetiem un kurā strīdi un pilsoņu karš aizstās brāļu mīlestību un laipnību, man nav šarma." 

"Pagātne ir mirusi, ļaujiet tai apglabāt savus mirušos, cerības un centienus, pirms jums slēpjas nākotne-zelta solījumu pilna nākotne." 

"Ļaujiet man teikt, ka nekādas briesmas un grūtības nekad neliek man vēlēties atgriezties šajā koledžas dzīvē."

"Mēs pārrunājām šo jautājumu un varējām izšķirt karu trīsdesmit minūtēs, ja tas būtu atstāts mūsu ziņā. " 

Nezināms konfederācijas karavīrs  starp rindām atsaucoties uz tikšanos ar Savienības karavīru.

"Ak, man no sirds ir apnicis dzirdēt par to, ko Lī darīs. Šķiet, ka daži no jums vienmēr domā, ka viņš pēkšņi pagriezīs dubultā kūleni un piezemēsies mūsu aizmugurē un abos sānos vienlaikus. Atgriezieties pie sava pavēles un mēģiniet domāt, ko mēs darīsim paši, nevis to, ko darīs Lī."

Uliss S. Grants (taisnība)

"Ziemeļvirdžīnijas armija nekad netika uzvarēta. Tā vienkārši nolieca ienaidnieka sitienu. " 

"Ja man piederētu Teksasa un elle, es izīrētu Teksasu un dzīvotu ellē."

"Ja mīlēt dienvidus, to lietu un tās prezidentu ir noziegums, tad es esmu noziedznieks. Es labprātāk apgultos šajā cietumā un nomirtu, nekā atstātu to, pateicoties uzticībai tādai valdībai kā jūsējā."

"Es aicinu jūs kā karavīru, lai pasargātu mani no pazemojuma, redzot, kā mans pulks soļo pretim ienaidniekam, un es nepiekrītu tā briesmām."

"Es zinu, ka [Džefersons] Deiviss domā, ka viņš var paveikt ļoti daudzas lietas, ko citi vīrieši vilcinās mēģināt. Piemēram, viņš centās darīt to, ko Dievs nespēja. Viņš mēģināja izgatavot Brakstona Braga karavīru."

"Kara māksla ir pietiekami vienkārša. Uzziniet, kur atrodas jūsu ienaidnieks. Pieskarieties viņam, cik drīz vien iespējams. Sitiet viņu, cik vien iespējams, un turpiniet iet."

Tas pagaidām ir viss. Ja jums ir daži iecienīti pilsoņu kara citāti, lūdzu, kopīgojiet tos komentāros zemāk.


Amerikāņi ir noguruši no kreisajiem meliem, ka ASV ir sistemātiski rasistiskas

Rasisms ir indivīda tiesību un privilēģiju prakse, kuras pamatā nav vienlīdzība saskaņā ar likumu, bet drīzāk atkarībā no tā, kāda rase šī persona ir dzimusi.

Tas ir pretrunā ar visiem principiem, uz kuriem tika balstīta mūsu valsts, sākot ar mūsu Neatkarības deklarācijas solījumu, ka “visi cilvēki ir radīti vienādi”, līdz mūsu Konstitūcijas vienlīdzīgas aizsardzības klauzulai. Tas bija ļaundabīgs audzējs, kuru cīnījāmies ar pilsoņu karu. Paaudžu paaudzēs ikviens amerikānis to ir nosodījis ar labu gribu par ļauno, kas tas ir.

Tomēr šī bīstamā sociālā patoloģija tagad valda Vašingtonā. Pārstāvju palātas Tiesu komiteja nesen pieņēma lēmumu par partijas balsojumu, lai izveidotu komisiju ar apzinātu mērķi rasismu iekļaut likumā verdzības atlīdzību aizsegā.

Šīs komisijas neobjektīvais sastāvs ir acīmredzams. Nav neviena republikāņu tikšanās. Tā ir izstrādāta, lai ieietu senajā mirušajā pagātnē, atdzīvinātu tās ļaunprātīgākos konfliktus un atkal ievadītu tos mūsu laikmetā.

Nav iespējams iedomāties sašķeltāku, polarizējošu vai netaisnīgāku pasākumu par tādu, kas izmantotu valdības spēku, lai pieprasītu cilvēkiem, kuriem nekad nav piederējuši vergi, maksāt atlīdzību cilvēkiem, kuri nekad nav bijuši vergi - pamatojoties nevis uz kaut ko, ko viņi darījuši, bet tikai rases dēļ. dzimis.

Vēsture mums piedāvā neizsmeļamu sūdzību un netaisnību krājumu, kas ir pietiekami spēcīgs, lai izraisītu naidu un aizvainojumu, kas var sagraut jebkuru sabiedrību. Tieši par to ir šī kustība. Tas savā ziņā ir ļauns, ja ne pēc nodoma.

Linkolns bieži norādīja, ka mūsu valsts ir dzimusi pasaulē, kur verdzība bija izveidota institūcija. Amerikāņu dibinātāji to apkaunoja un mūsu dibināšanas dokumentos iekļāva principus, ka viņi ir pārliecināti, ka galu galā ļaunā iestāde tiks pakļauta izmiršanai un radīs republiku, kurā visas rases un izcelsmes vīrieši un sievietes kopā varētu baudīt brīvības svētības.

Vienlīdzīgs taisnīgums saskaņā ar likumu nozīmē daltoniķu sabiedrību, kurā rasei vienkārši nav nozīmes, un līdz nesenam laikam mēs bijām guvuši milzīgu progresu šīs nācijas redzējuma virzienā.

Mācītājs Dr.

Rasistiski kreiso spēku uzbrukums tagad ir vienlīdzīga likuma un krāsu aklo sabiedrības vīzijas aizsardzība, sākot no amerikāņu dibinātājiem līdz Linkolnam un doktoram Kingam.

Jā, mūsu sabiedrībā ir rasisti. Katrā sabiedrībā ir visu krāsu rasisti, tā ir cilvēka dabas zemākā puse. Bet neviena tauta nav pacietīgāk cīnījusies, lai pārvarētu šo dabu un izolētu un atstumtu savus rasistus, nekā amerikāņi.

Jā, ārkārtīgi kaitīga un muļķīga politika pēdējās desmitgadēs ir nesamērīgi skārusi melnādainās kopienas. Skolas, kurās dominē arodbiedrības un kurām nav izdevies izglītot bērnus iekšpilsētās, labklājības programmas, kas iznīcināja ģimenes, un policijas aizsardzības atņemšana no noziedzības skartajiem rajoniem. Bet šī politika iznīcina visas kopienas, kurās tās tiek praktizētas, neatkarīgi no rases. Atbilde ir mainīt šo politiku - neattaisnot to, jo tā ideoloģiski patīk kreisajiem.

Rasistiskie kreisie ir apmierināti, ignorējot visas šīs pašreizējās nepatikšanas. Tā vietā tiek mēģināts nostādīt kaimiņu pret kaimiņu un amerikāni pret amerikāni, pamatojoties uz viņu rasi. Viņi saka, ka tas ir dziedinošs. Tas ir tieši pretēji. Viņi to zina. Patiešām, viņi ar to rēķinās.

Katras rases un ticības apliecības labas gribas amerikāņiem ar to ir gana. Viņiem ir apnicis redzēt, kā mūsu bērni tiek mācīti ienīst sevi un ienīst viens otru. Viņiem ir apnicis redzēt, ka mūsu valsti par rasistisku demonizē tie, kuru pirmā un vienīgā uzmanība tiek pievērsta rasei. Viņi ir noguruši no meliem, ka mūsu tauta ir sistemātiski rasistiska, ja tā ir darījusi vairāk, lai radītu pilsonisku un tolerantu daudzu rasu sabiedrību nekā jebkurš cilvēks civilizācijas vēsturē.

Jau sen ir pagājis laiks, kad katrs amerikānis no katra mantojuma nosoda šo ļaunumu par to, kas tas ir, un izskaust no mūsu pilsoniskā diskursa tos pārliecinošos ēsmas, kas ir piesārņojuši mūsu nacionālo dialogu un sabojājuši mūsu nacionālo mantojumu.


Īss pārskats par Amerikas pilsoņu karu

Pilsoņu karš ir centrālais notikums Amerikas vēsturiskajā apziņā. Kamēr 1776.-1783. Gada revolūcija radīja ASV, 1861.-1865. Gada pilsoņu karš noteica, kāda tauta tā būs. Karš atrisināja divus pamatjautājumus, kurus revolūcija neatbildēja: vai Amerikas Savienotajām Valstīm bija jābūt suverēnu valstu šķīstošai konfederācijai vai nedalāmai tautai ar suverēnu valsts valdību, un vai šī tauta, kas dzimusi no paziņojuma, ka visi cilvēki ir radīti ar vienādas tiesības uz brīvību, turpinās pastāvēt kā lielākā vergu turētāja valsts pasaulē.

Ziemeļu uzvara karā saglabāja ASV kā vienu tautu un izbeidza verdzības institūciju, kas bija sadalījusi valsti no tās sākuma. Taču šie sasniegumi maksāja 625 000 dzīvību-gandrīz tikpat daudz amerikāņu karavīru, cik gāja bojā visos citos karos, kuros šī valsts kopā cīnījusies. Amerikas pilsoņu karš bija lielākais un postošākais konflikts Rietumu pasaulē starp Napoleona karu beigām 1815. gadā un Pirmā pasaules kara sākumu 1914. gadā.

Nacionālais arhīvs

Pilsoņu karš sākās bezkompromisa atšķirību dēļ starp brīvajām un vergu valstīm attiecībā uz valsts valdības pilnvarām aizliegt verdzību teritorijās, kas vēl nebija kļuvušas par štatiem. Kad Ābrahams Linkolns 1860. gadā uzvarēja vēlēšanās kā pirmais republikāņu prezidents platformā, kas apņēmās nepieļaut verdzību no teritorijām, septiņas vergu valstis dziļajos dienvidos atdalījās un izveidoja jaunu valsti - Amerikas Savienotās Valstis. Nākamā Linkolna administrācija un lielākā daļa ziemeļu iedzīvotāju atteicās atzīt atdalīšanās leģitimitāti. Viņi baidījās, ka tā diskreditēs demokrātiju un radīs liktenīgu precedentu, kas galu galā sadrumstalos vairs nederīgās Amerikas Savienotās Valstis vairākās mazās, strīdīgās valstīs.

Notikums, kas izraisīja karu, notika Fort Sumter pilsētā Čārlstonas līcī 1861. gada 12. aprīlī. Konfederācijas armija, apgalvojot šo ASV fortu kā savu, tajā dienā atklāja uguni uz federālo garnizonu un piespieda to nolaist Amerikas karogu, lai padotos. Linkolns aicināja miliciju apspiest šo "sacelšanos". Vēl četras vergu valstis atdalījās un pievienojās Konfederācijai. Līdz 1861. gada beigām gandrīz miljons bruņotu vīriešu stājās pretī līnijai, kas stiepās 1200 jūdzes no Virdžīnijas līdz Misūri. Jau bija notikušas vairākas cīņas-netālu no Manassas Junction Virdžīnijas štatā, Rietumvirdžīnijas kalnos, kur Savienības uzvaras pavēra ceļu jauna Rietumvirdžīnijas štata izveidei, pie Vilsona līča Misūri, pie Hatteras raga Ziemeļkarolīnā. Port Royal Dienvidkarolīnā, kur Savienības flote izveidoja bāzi blokādei, lai izslēgtu Konfederācijas piekļuvi ārpasaulei.

Bet patiesās cīņas sākās 1862. gadā. Milzīgas cīņas, piemēram, Šilo Tenesī, Geinsa dzirnavas, Otrā Manasa un Frederiksburga Virdžīnijā, un Antietama Merilendā, paredzēja vēl lielākas kampaņas un cīņas turpmākajos gados, sākot no Getisburgas Pensilvānijā līdz Viksburgai Misisipi štatā. uz Čikamaugu un Atlantu Gruzijā. Līdz 1864. gadam sākotnējais Ziemeļu mērķis - ierobežots karš - atjaunot Savienību - bija devis ceļu jaunai “pilnīga kara” stratēģijai, lai iznīcinātu vecos dienvidus un tās verdzības pamatinstitūciju un dotu atjaunotajai Savienībai “jaunu brīvības dzimšanu”. "Kā prezidents Linkolns teica savā uzrunā Getisburgā, lai veltītu kapsētu kaujās kritušajiem Savienības karavīriem.

Aleksandra Gārdnera slavenā konfederācijas fotogrāfija mirusi pirms Dunker baznīcas Antietam kaujas laukā Šārpsburgā, Md., 1862. gadā. Kongresa bibliotēka

Trīs garus gadus, no 1862. līdz 1865. gadam, Roberta E. Lī Ziemeļvirdžīnijas armija novērsa Potomakas Savienības armijas iebrukumus un uzbrukumus, ko vadīja neefektīvi ģenerāļi, līdz Uliss S. Grants ieradās Virdžīnijā no Rietumu teātra līdz 1864. gadā kļuva par visu Savienības armiju ģenerāli. Pēc asiņainām cīņām vietās ar tādiem nosaukumiem kā Tuksnesis, Spotsilvānija, Aukstā osta un Pēterburga, Grants 1865. gada aprīlī beidzot noveda Lī pie Appomattox līča. Tikmēr Savienības armijas un upju flotes kara teātrī, kurā ietilpst vergu valstis uz rietumiem no Apalaču kalnu ķēdes, izcīnīja ilgu uzvaru sēriju pār Konfederācijas armijām, kuras vadīja nelaimīgi vai neveiksmīgi Konfederācijas ģenerāļi. 1864.-1865. Gadā ģenerālis Viljams Tecumseh Sherman vadīja savu armiju dziļi Gruzijas un Dienvidkarolīnas Konfederācijas centrā, iznīcinot to ekonomisko infrastruktūru, savukārt ģenerālis Džordžs Tomass faktiski iznīcināja Konfederācijas Tenesijas armiju Nešvilas kaujā.

Līdz 1865. gada pavasarim visas galvenās Konfederācijas armijas padevās, un, kad Savienības kavalērija 1865. gada 10. maijā Gruzijā sagūstīja bēgošo Konfederācijas prezidentu Džefersonu Deivisu, pretošanās sabruka un karš beidzās. Sākās ilgs, sāpīgs process, lai no verdzības atbrīvotu vienotu valsti atjaunotu.


Dienvidu valstu savienības blokāde

Savienības Jūras spēku blokāde izolēja Konfederāciju un neļāva tai izveidot pilna mēroga kara ekonomiku.

Gadsimtiem ilgi blokādes ir bijušas svarīgs karojošu tautu instruments, un, ja tās ir veiksmīgas, tās ir ieguvušas priekšrocības valstij, kas to īstenoja. 1861. gada aprīlī Ābrahams Linkolns paziņoja, ka ieviesīs Konfederācijas piekrastes blokādi. Linkolna aicinājums uz blokādi, kas radīja nepieciešamību pēc lielas flotes, iespējams, bija viņa gudrākais kara laika lēmums, ņemot vērā šī dienesta svarīgo lomu konflikta laikā.

ASV kara flote nebija tālu no spēka, kad sākās karš, un nespēja bloķēt visu Konfederācijas piekrasti. Uz papīra flotē bija tikai deviņdesmit karakuģi. Piecdesmit bija buru kuģi, no kuriem lielākie bija noderīgi galvenokārt kā uzņemšanas un mācību kuģi. No uzskaitītajiem četrdesmit tvaika kuģiem divi gulēja nepabeigti, trīs kalpoja kā uzņemšanas kuģi, bet trīs patrulēja Lielajos ezeros. Astoņi citi, tostarp piecas tvaika fregates, tika novietoti remontam. Šīs piecas tvaika fregates bija galvenais amerikāņu jūras spēka elements. Lai gan tie bija milzīgi karakuģi, tie nevarēja efektīvi patrulēt dienvidu seklajos ūdeņos to dziļo iegrimes dēļ. Jūras spēkiem bija tikai trīs bruņoti kuģi, kas bija gatavi dienestam Atlantijas okeāna krastā kara sākumā. Pārējie kuģi atradās Meksikas līcī vai ārvalstu stacijās, no kurām daži sešus mēnešus neatgriezās. [1]

Paziņojums par blokādi tika nosūtīts divos ziņojumos. Pirmais bija Linkolna paziņojums 19. aprīlī, un tajā bija iekļauti visi piekrastes Konfederācijas štati, izņemot Ziemeļkarolīnu un Virdžīniju. 27. aprīlī Linkolns izdeva otru paziņojumu, kurā bija iekļauti pēdējie divi štati. Viņš proklamācijās norādīja, ka Amerikas Savienotās Valstis ievēros tautu likumus un ka karakuģi vispirms izsauks brīdinājumu un saķers jebkuru kuģi, mēģinot izvairīties no blokādes. [2]

Blokādes juridiskie aspekti

Pirms paziņojuma par blokādi Linkolns un viņa kabinets apsprieda citas iespējas. Linkolna ideja bloķēt Konfederāciju saskārās ar zināmām domstarpībām. Daži apgalvoja, ka valdībai vajadzētu slēgt ostas, nevis tās bloķēt. Par abiem piedāvātajiem plāniem sākās karstas diskusijas. Pieņemot, ka sacelšanās bija iekšēja cīņa, valdība varēja vienkārši slēgt dienvidu ostas saskaņā ar ASV likumiem. Ostu slēgšana šķita vienkārša, un tam bija nepieciešams tikai izpildraksts. Viens no šīs pieejas trūkumiem bija tāds, ka slēgšanas rīkojums ļāva to izpildīt tikai Amerikas teritoriālajos ūdeņos. Turklāt šī rīkojuma pārkāpēji būtu pārkāpuši tikai Amerikas Savienoto Valstu ieņēmumu likumu, un tādējādi tos varētu tiesāt tikai federālajā tiesā tajā štatā un apgabalā, kurā noticis pārkāpums, un tas nav iespējams, jo viņi tagad ir konfederācijas kontrolē. Vēl svarīgāk ir tas, ka ostu slēgšana nepiespiestu Eiropas valstis atzīt šo rīcību, jo starptautiskās tiesības neatzina šo tirdzniecības aizlieguma veidu.

Valsts sekretārs Viljams Henrijs Sevards pārliecināja Linkolnu pieņemt blokādi. Sevards zināja, ka lielākā daļa pasaules valstu atzīst blokādes, kas ļaus izvairīties no starptautiskiem sarežģījumiem. Izsniedzot paziņojumu par blokādi, Savienība tomēr netieši piešķīra Konfederācijai karojoša statusa, jo blokāde ir kareivīgas tiesības un nozīmē, ka notiek cīņa ar ārēju ienaidnieku.

1861. gada 13. maijā Lielbritānijas valdība paziņoja par neitralitāti. Briti neprotestēja pret Linkolna blokādi, jo viņu ilgtermiņa jūras intereses bija blokādes prakses paplašināšana un saglabāšana. Lai gan amerikāņu blokāde viņus kaitināja, radīja naidīgumu un brīžiem bija neērti, briti to pieņēma. 16. maijā savu pieņemšanu apstiprināja arī Francija. [3] Ar Francijas atbalstu kļuva skaidrs, ka Eiropas lielvalstis atzīs ASV blokādi, ja jūras spēki to saglabās saskaņā ar starptautiskajām tiesībām. Tas atrisināja vienu no Savienības agrākajiem un nopietnākajiem jautājumiem.

13. jūlijā, sešas dienas pēc pirmās blokādes pasludināšanas, kongress pieņēma ostu likumu. Šis tiesību akts deva prezidentam pilnvaras slēgt ostas. Linkolns gudri turpināja blokādi un neizmantoja šo likumu, lai slēgtu ostu līdz 1865. gada 11. aprīlim, ilgi pēc tam, kad ārvalstu iejaukšanās vairs nedraudēja.

1856. gada Parīzes deklarācija ietvēra starptautiskos blokādes prakses standartus. Lielākā daļa pasaules un rsquos valstu parakstīja šo līgumu, bet ASV nebija parakstījusi. Starptautiskie tiesību akti noteica tikai to, ka, lai novērstu saziņu, ostas ieejā vienmēr jābūt pietiekamam spēkam & rdquo. Pēc visplašākās likuma interpretācijas viens kuģis kvalificējās kā atbilstošs spēks.

Savienības kuģiem bija jānosaka katras Konfederācijas ostas blokāde, par to rakstiski paziņojot. Pēc šī paziņojuma nokļūšanas krastā ostā esošajiem kuģiem bija 15 dienas, lai izbrauktu, nebaidoties no sagūstīšanas. Kad flote uzsāka ostas blokādi, vismaz vienam kuģim bija jāpaliek stacijā. Ja kāda iemesla dēļ bloķētāji aizbrauca vai laika apstākļi vai ienaidnieka karakuģi viņus padzina, tad flotei bija jāatjauno blokāde. Tam bija jānosūta cits paziņojums krastā, un kuģiem tika dots 15 dienu labvēlības periods bez soda.

Kara sākumā daži Savienības līderi uzskatīja, ka visaptverošai blokādei būs nepieciešami tikai trīsdesmit karakuģi. Realitāte ātri kliedēja šo priekšstatu, jo blokāde daudzus mēnešus nebija pat nedaudz efektīva. Sešu nedēļu laikā pēc Sumtera forta bombardēšanas gandrīz 30 000 kokvilnas ķīpu atstāja Čārlstonas ostu vien. No 1861. gada jūnija līdz decembrim pa iekšējiem ūdensceļiem Čārlstonā ieradās 150 kuģi, galvenokārt nelieli piekrastes kuģi. Pārējās lielākajās dienvidu ostās bija līdzīga tirdzniecība. Šai atlaidībai bija Atlanta Dienas inteliģents lielīties, un ldquo Lincoln & rsquos blokādei jāvalda pat Timbucktoo! & rdquo [4]

Mēģinot izstrādāt vispārēju stratēģiju un piedāvāt risinājumus dažādām iespējamām problēmām, Jūras spēku sekretārs Gideons Velss izveidoja Konferences komisiju, kas pazīstama arī kā Blokādes stratēģijas padome. Šī valde bija vienīgā grupa, kas tikās kara laikā un kuras raksturs pietuvojās ģenerālštāba iezīmēm. Ideja par šīs valdes izveidi radās profesoram Aleksandram Dalasam Bašem, ASV krasta apsekojuma vadītājam. 1861. gada 27. jūnijā valdē bija Baše, Vašingtonas armijas departamenta galvenais inženieris, majors Džons Gross Barnards un divi jūras virsnieki, kapteinis Čārlzs Henrijs Deiviss, kurš pildīja ierakstu un sekretāra pienākumus, un kapteinis Semjuels Fransiss Du Pont, kurš kalpoja kā krēsls.

Valde tikās Smitsona institūtā no jūlija līdz septembrim. Pārbaudot diagrammas un pētot hidrogrāfisko, topogrāfisko un ģeogrāfisko informāciju, tās locekļi izstrādāja stratēģijas un metodes, lai padarītu blokādi efektīvāku. Viņi arī uzkrāja informāciju, kas nepieciešama, lai izveidotu loģistikas bāzes. Sešos galvenajos ziņojumos un četros papildu ziņojumos viņi ieteica punktus, kurus jūras spēki varētu izmantot kā ogļu stacijas un jūras bāzes. Valde arī sagatavoja vispārīgu ceļvedi visām blokādes operācijām, kurām Jūras spēku departaments cieši sekoja visā kara laikā. [5]

Lai patrulētu 3500 jūdzes seklajā piekrastē, kurā ir 189 ieplūdes, ostas un upes, būtu nepieciešami daudz lielāki spēki, nekā jūras spēkiem bija pieejams 1861. gada aprīlī. Konfederācijas krasta līnijas īpašā ģeogrāfija sarežģīja blokādes īstenošanu un uzturēšanu. Šo izaicinājumu papildināja daudzas barjeru salas, kas aizsargāja ieejas lielākajā daļā Konfederācijas piekrastes. Ieplūdes atdalīja šīs salas ar intervālu un bieži atvērās lielās grīvās. Šis sarežģītais ūdensceļu tīkls ļāva sekla iegrimes kuģiem uzturēt sakarus atvērtus, neiebraucot Atlantijas okeānā vai Meksikas līcī.

1861. gada maijā Jūras spēku departaments sākotnēji izveidoja divas blokādes eskadras. Atlantijas blokādes eskadrona un rsquos pienākumos ietilpa austrumu ostas no Česapīkas līča līdz Key West, Floridā, un Persijas līča blokādes eskadra, kas patrulēja no Key West līdz Rio Grande. 1861. gada oktobra beigās Atlantijas blokādes eskadra sadalījās jaunizveidotajās Ziemeļatlantijas un Dienvidatlantijas blokādes eskadriļās. Ziemeļatlantijas blokādes eskadrona un rsquos pienākumi bija Virdžīnijas un Ziemeļkarolīnas krasti, un Dienvidatlantijas blokādes eskadrona vēroja piekrasti no Dienvidkarolīnas līdz Key West. Vēlāk pēdējā robeža pārcēlās, iekļaujot piekrasti tikai līdz dienvidiem līdz Kanaverala ragam. The Gulf Coast Blockading Squadron split in February 1862. The East Gulf Blockading Squadron patrolled from Cape Canaveral to St. Andrew&rsquos Bay, Florida, and the West Gulf Blockading Squadron&rsquos area of responsibility began west of St. Andrew&rsquos Bay, Florida and stretched to the Rio Grande.

An early embarrassment to the efficiency of the blockade was the operation of Confederate privateers. The majority of these vessels sortied out of Charleston, Savannah and New Orleans. These warships operated under Letters of Marque issued by the Confederate government. This commission allowed private vessels to make prizes of Union shipping. The privateers, however, could only operate out of Confederate ports since international law, as laid out in the 1856 Declaration of Paris, did not recognize privateering. Thus, once they captured a prize they had to return to a Confederate port. While these vessels had limited early successes, as the blockade became more stringent they could not operate without extreme risk and by 1862, they were no longer a threat. They did, however, occupy the full attention of the naval authorities early in the war. While the Union officials protested this form of warfare, the United States failure to sign the 1856 Declaration of Paris, gave it little sympathy from foreign governments.

In May 1861, when the Atlantic Coast Blockading Squadron formed, it included only fourteen warships. There were only three major port cities to watch from Virginia to Key West&mdashthey were Norfolk, Charleston and Savannah. Norfolk never developed as a Confederate port because of the United States Navy&rsquos presence in the Chesapeake Bay. The ports in the sounds of North Carolina also might have served the Confederacy. The shallow draft of the bars entering the sounds limited the trade and by the spring of 1862 most of the interior towns were under Union control.

Union warships did not blockade Savannah, Georgia until June 1861. The single narrow channel that led into the river made the blockade of this port relatively simple. When Union forces captured Fort Pulaski, guarding the mouth of the Savannah River, in April 1862, this effectively closed the port to most of the traffic. [6]

Even apart from its political and psychological importance, Charleston stood out as the major port on the Atlantic Coast and the most crucial to blockade. The city had a wide and deep harbor, one of the best in the south. The bar lay about five miles from the harbor entrance and four main channels offered access into the harbor. When Bermuda and Nassau became the major points of transshipment for blockade goods, the port of Charleston with its well-developed rail connections became a prime port. Only about 780 miles from Bermuda and just over 500 miles from Nassau, Charleston offered a quick trip for blockade runners. Until early 1863, Charleston served as the Confederacy&rsquos most frequented port and remained open for business until February 1865.

By the beginning of 1863, Charleston became the major target of the Union military forces and the Navy Department sent a large number of warships and ironclads there. After the April 1863 attack on the forts at the mouth of the harbor, the ironclads moved into the main ship channel and these warships effectively restricted the blockade running traffic. It was at this time that Wilmington, North Carolina, became the most important port in the Confederacy. While there was already a brisk trade at Wilmington, the virtual closure of Charleston forced the Confederacy and the mercantile firms running the blockade to refocus their efforts. Wilmington&rsquos importance as a blockade running port was unsurpassed for the rest of the war.

Wilmington was North Carolina&rsquos principal seaport and, with a population of about ten thousand, the state's largest city. In 1861, the city boasted the largest naval stores market in the country and traded in other natural resources. At the beginning of the war Wilmington seemed to have no special attribute that would make it so important to the Confederacy. Wilmington was an important port in North Carolina, but compared to Charleston, Norfolk, and Savannah its overall trade was miniscule. It was not considered important enough to blockade until nearly three months into the war

Geography and communications determined Wilmington's growth and importance. Wilmington had rail connections to both Charleston and Richmond, which linked it to two of the Confederacy's most important cities. Wilmington lay on the banks of the Cape Fear River, twenty miles from the river&rsquos mouth and fifteen miles from a second navigable entrance at New Inlet, and beyond the reach of a direct assault by naval vessels. Smith Island lay between the two navigable entrances and stretched for six miles into the ocean. In addition, Frying Pan Shoals extended over twenty miles farther into the Atlantic, making the distance between the inlets by sea almost fifty miles while the distance directly between them was only six or seven. The double inlets required two separate blockading forces and made it possible for the blockade runners to lie in the river and to observe the blockading fleet at their stations and then choose the most weakly guarded inlet from which to make their escape.

After Bermuda and Nassau became the major points for transshipment of goods into the South, Wilmington became even more convenient. Large ships brought contraband cargoes to these island ports where smaller and faster blockade runners carried them to the Confederacy. Only 570 miles from Nassau, a steamer could travel to Wilmington in 48 hours. Bermuda was only 674 miles from Wilmington and a steamer could make the trip in about 72 hours.

During the war, more than 100 different steamers ran the blockade of Wilmington about 260 times in total. Stopping this trade became a priority for the Navy Department and the naval force here became the largest concentration of warships of any squadron. Additionally, the tactics to stop blockade running continually evolved and some of the Union warships patrolled as far as 130 miles offshore and along the tracks of the blockade runners coming from the island entrepots.

The blockade of the Gulf Coast was, in some ways, more difficult than the East Coast blockade. While both Charleston and Wilmington attracted a large Confederate trade, the expansive and shallow waters of the Gulf Coast also invited blockade running activity. The Navy Department initially focused on many of the busy Confederate ports on the Atlantic, but the vastness of the Gulf coast would stymie the federal government&rsquos efforts to forge an effective blockade. From the Gulf&rsquos entrance at Key West to Brownsville was nearly 2,000 miles, not including the interior waters of the bays and the inlets that stretched along the coast. Like the Atlantic Coast, shallow water and barrier islands limited most of the trade to shallow draft vessels. Only a couple of entrances to the Mississippi River, Mobile, Alabama, and Galveston, Texas, could accommodate oceangoing steam blockade runners. The rest of the coast was perfectly suited to small vessels&mdashparticularly schooners.

During the war, schooners violated the blockade on the Gulf Coast more than any other type of vessel. They were fast, could sail close to the wind and could escape into the small shallow inlets. During the night and certain phases of the weather, they were nearly impossible to detect. The owners of these craft were often owner/operators. They carried local produce like cotton and sugar out and usually imported dry goods, medicines and items that they could sell locally. [7] The steam powered blockade runners, however, received the most attention from the Union navy. Local papers heralded their passage through the blockade and this alerted the Navy Department.

The trade along the Gulf coast differed from that seen along the East Coast because small sailing vessels, in large numbers, ran the blockade of the Gulf coast throughout the war. With a fleet consisting of mainly large warships, the task of blockading the Gulf coast effectively was initially nearly impossible. During 1861, in the Gulf alone, over 400 different vessels ran through the Union cordon more than 1,600 times in total. From 1861-65, there were nearly 3,000 attempts to run the blockade of the Gulf coast, about two a day, a rate 33% more than on the East Coast. [8]

The Capture of New Orleans

The most important ports in the Gulf were Mobile, New Orleans and Galveston. The five entrances to the Mississippi River were difficult to watch with only the small naval force available in the first months of the war. New Orleans was the Confederacy&rsquos largest city and a major manufacturing center. These attributes made the city an important target and with the warships struggling to contain blockade running, the Navy Department organized an expedition to capture the city. This was part of a larger goal of the department to gain control the Mississippi River. The capture of New Orleans in 1862 stopped the blockade running trade into the river and was a blow to the Confederacy, denying it its largest city and commercial center.

For most of the war, the West Gulf Blockading Squadron&rsquos major task was the blockade of Mobile, Alabama. The entrance to Mobile had features that complicated the Union&rsquos success. Outside the harbor were several bars and islands that dissected the entrance. The outer bar was more than three miles from the mouth of the harbor. Four channels led to the mouth of the bay. Deep draft vessels could enter the main channel only. Complicating the blockade&rsquos enforcement here was the shallow water to either side of the main ship channel. It allowed only the most shallow draft warships to maneuver in these shoal areas. The Confederate defenses, likewise, kept the Union ships at a distance from the mouth of the harbor. Mobile remained the most important port in the Gulf during the war because the larger steam blockade runners could access the harbor and the city&rsquos rail connections led to important points in the Confederacy.

Havana served as the main entrepot for blockade goods running into the Gulf Coast ports. Only 590 miles from Mobile, steam blockade runners could make the trip in two days. As the war progressed and more warships were available, the blockaders began patrolling along the approaches to Havana to curtail the trade.

Mobile remained a viable and important port until August 5, 1864. On this day, a fleet led by Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut advanced into the harbor and defeated the Confederate warships in the Battle of Mobile Bay. This ended Mobile&rsquos role as a Confederate port.

Galveston, Texas was a shallow-water port allowing vessels with no more than a 13-foot draft to enter. While this was a major limitation, the lack of rail connections in the state of Texas was even more so. None of the state&rsquos railroads connected east of the Mississippi and this limited the importance of any goods imported into Galveston. Galveston&rsquos value, however, increased slightly after the Battle of Mobile Bay in August 1864. This port remained open until June 1865. The surrender of the forces in the Trans-Mississippi occurred later than R.E. Lee&rsquos surrender. Kirby Smith&rsquos command did not officially surrender until 2 June and the Union forces took control of Galveston on 5 June. Like the rest of the Gulf Coast, small schooners sailed in and out of this port with near impunity. Its closeness to Havana, ports in Mexico and the British colony of Belize enabled small sailing craft to make their journeys quickly. Some of these craft made more than two dozen trips during the war.

The East Gulf Blockading Squadron handled the blockade of the state of Florida. The blockade of this state, while never easy, did not have the dire strategic consequences as other areas. The sparse population of the state and its lack of railroad connections to the rest of the South limited the value of the cargoes to the Confederacy and to the merchants who would illegally run the blockade. Small craft performed most of the blockade running and the cargoes mainly benefited the local inhabitants rather than the Confederacy.

Commerce Raiders, Torpedo Boats and Ironclads

Confederate commerce raiders, like the Alabama un Florida, torpedo boats, and Confederate ironclads challenged the maintenance of the blockade and made blockade duty uncertain and dangerous. [9] Despite the numerous attacks by these classes of Confederate warships, there were few Union losses. Pēc tam, kad Alabama attacked and sank the Hatteras off Galveston, the small and lone gunboats could not safely make patrols along stretches of the Gulf Coast or to blockade shallow inlets without support. The real impact that the commerce raiders had on the blockade was the detachment of large numbers of naval vessels to chase the Confederate warships around the world, decreasing the effectiveness of the blockade. The greatest threat to the blockaders in fact, proved to be from small steamers or small boat expeditions that sortied against sail-powered or anchored blockaders. They managed to capture and destroy many Union ships during the war.

Types of Blockading Ships/Purchasing Program

Because the Union navy began the war with only a small number of warships and many of them incapable of blockading the Southern coast, the Navy Department had to both purchase and build a navy. Initially, it obtained every steam vessel it could purchase in the Northern ports, including tugs, ferryboats, and passenger vessels. These steamers often made less than adequate blockaders. Not designed to carry heavy guns or large crews, the merchant ships frequently had no protection for their engines, some of which lay above deck.

The initial building program that augmented the navy was that which built the Unadilla-class gunboats often called the 90-day gunboats due to their rapid construction. There were twenty-three in this class and they served both as blockaders and in river operations. Following this, the navy also constructed twenty-eight Sassacus-class gunboats that served in a similar capacity. Particularly valuable were the sloops of war constructed during the war. These vessels had heavy armament, good speed and a long cruising range and were capable of dealing with commerce raiders, other enemy combatants and Confederate fortifications.

The Union navy also had success converting captured blockade runners into blockading vessels. These ships often served as successful blockaders due to their speed. Piemēri ietver Roberts E. , which became the USS Forts Donelson, un Ella un Annie renamed the USS Malvern.

Early in the war, passenger steamers, square-rigged sailing vessels and other pre-war traders ran the blockade. Sailing vessels tested the Union blockade more than any other type of vessel. Sailing vessels, however, were generally slower than steamers, lookouts could see them farther at sea, and they were dependent on the weather and the currents to move. Gradually these ships became less capable of successfully evading the Union ships once the Navy Department stationed more warships off the major ports. While large vessels powered by wind alone could no longer be risked, fast schooners ran the blockade during the entire war.

Stopping steam powered blockade runners developed into the Union navy&rsquos greatest challenge. The British, the main participants in this trade, began building steam ships to meet the challenges of a stricter blockade. These new, specially designed steamers were the fastest of the day. Usually constructed of iron or steel, they sat low in the water, had extremely narrow beams and rakish designs, and sometimes had turtle-back forward decks to help them drive through heavy seas. Both screw and side-wheel vessels had distinct advantages.

Avoiding detection was the most important characteristic necessary for the success of the blockade runners. In many cases, they carried only a light pair of lower masts, with no yards. A small crow's nest on one of the masts often appeared as the only alteration from the ship's sharp outline and low profile. Some steamers had telescoping funnels, which the crew could lower to the deck in order to maintain the lowest profile possible. Usually painted a dull grey to camouflage the vessel, they also sported other colors and in some instances, the color approached a pinkish hue. When approaching the shore, these vessels showed no lights, and sometimes muffled their paddle wheels with canvas, all to avoid detection.

High profits were the incentive that lured many foreign businessmen into the trade. A single round trip might allow profits enough to pay for both the cargo and the vessel. These high returns ensured that the trade would continue. A well-handled steamer could average about one round trip a month but might make a round trip in as little as eight days. Some of the blockade runners ran through the blockade as regularly as packets.

General Practices of the Blockade

Early in the war, the blockaders usually lay at anchor but remained ready to move. They normally maintained their stations at the main ship channels only. Shallow draft vessels running the blockade had easy access to nearly all the water near the ports, and this complicated the enforcement of the blockade when many of the Union warships were large and had deep drafts. With few ships available, the naval vessels irregularly checked the shallower inlets nearby the main ports, usually doing so when cruising for coal and repairs and travelling back to their blockading stations.

The Confederate defenses at the entrances to the ports or inlets complicated the enforcement of the blockade. The threat of gunfire kept the warships at a respectable distance and gave an added advantage to blockade runners that could get under the protection of the defenses. During the day the blockaders anchored out of the range of the fortifications, but at night usually moved nearer the mouth of the harbors and as near as they could to the Confederate defenses without being seen. They changed their positions before daylight. At night, small picket boats deployed from the blockaders and patrolled closer to shore and into the shallow areas giving better coverage. These craft could get close in at night and they could signal the warships when a blockade runner left port.

On both the Atlantic and Gulf coasts the flag officers, when possible, kept what they termed a close blockade. A single vessel lying directly in the channel could control the waterway and virtually stop blockade running activity. The blockaders could only do this when there were no Confederate defenses, but it effectively closed the most shallow and less important entrances. These vessels, however, were most vulnerable to attacks by Confederate gunboats and small boats.

Blockading tactics continued to evolve as the war progressed. As more vessels became available, the warships increasingly patrolled farther from the harbors and along the shipping lanes, particularly those leading to Havana, Bermuda and Nassau. The steam blockaders also began moving about more at night, ready to chase blockade violators. These practices increased the stringency of the blockade.

While weather, enemy activity and other operational needs had an impact on the blockade, logistical problems had an equally large influence on its effectiveness. The logistical difficulties became more evident as the warships began to take their stations in numbers and the navy deployed more steamers. During the first month of the war, the Navy Department realized that getting coal to the blockaders would be a vital concern. Despite the efforts to establish coaling bases and repair facilities, as much as 20% of the blockading fleet remained away for coal or repairs during much of the war. In mid-1864, the navy had the equivalent of an entire squadron sitting in repair facilities waiting to get back to their stations.

Scholars still debate the effectiveness of the blockade and the lack of Confederate customs records makes the question difficult to resolve. In North and South Carolina, there were at least 2,054 attempts to run through the blockade, averaging 1.5 attempts a day. Along these coasts over 472 different sailing vessels tested the blockade. The steamers numbered over 250. [10] Looking at figures for the blockade of the Gulf Coast, it makes the blockade look like a sieve. There were nearly 2,500 successful trips into Gulf ports, an 83% success rate, and nearly two attempts each day. Blockade runners, however, made a large percentage of their successful trips during the first year of the war. [11] The figures, however, do not tell the full story. Small sailing craft made most of these successful runs and their cargoes contributed little to the war effort.

The blockade&rsquos effectiveness relied on its deterrence, and after 1862, only the fastest and most specialized steam vessels could successfully escape. Small sailing vessels did continue to run the blockade in the Gulf of Mexico. While much materiel passed through the blockade, it amounted to only a small percentage of the South&rsquos pre-war commerce. The Confederacy might have solved a number of its manufacturing and transportation issues had the blockade never been implemented. The Union blockade isolated the Confederacy and kept it from establishing a full-scale war economy. It exacerbated inflation and when the raw materials ran out, or the Union forces captured or destroyed the industrial centers, the Confederacy had little means to replace the losses. The blockade, while not airtight, created a situation whereby the Confederacy could not hope to win a long lasting conflict.

  • The quotation in the title is from Gideon Welles to David Farragut, January 25, 1862 in United States Navy Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 31 vols. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1894-1927), Series I, volume 18, p. 9, (hereafter cited as O.R.N., I, 18, 9). [1] Robert M. Browning Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 1-2. Receiving ships were usually old or obsolete ships stationed at navy yards. They served as floating barracks and accommodated new recruits and men awaiting orders.
  • [2] Proclamation by Abraham Lincoln, 19, 27 April 1861 in O.R.N., I, 5, 620-1).
  • [3] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, 5.
  • [4] Hills to Wells, 2 May 1861, in O.R.N., I, 5, 361 Daily Intelligencer, (Atlanta) September 18, 1861.
  • [5] Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, 9.
  • [6] Vessels did patrol off Savannah earlier but did not remain.
  • [7] See William Watson, The Civil War Adventures of a Blockade Runner ( London: Unwin Brothers, 1892).
  • [8] Marcus W. Price, “Ships that Tested the Blockade of the Gulf Ports: 1861-1865,” The American Neptune, Sēj. XI, No. 4 (Oct. 1951):262, 290. Price includes the entire Gulf in his figures, which would include the ports in West Florida.
  • [9] Torpedo boats were small fast craft that carried a spar torpedo that projected in front of the vessel. The weapon was discharged by running the torpedo into the enemy’s ship.
  • [10] Marcus W. Price, “Ships that Tested the Blockade of the Gulf Ports: 1861-1865,” The American Neptune, Sēj. XII, No. 3 (July 1952): 236.
  • [11] Price, “Ships that Tested the Blockade of the Gulf Ports”, 196, 199.

If you can read only one book:

Browning, Robert M. Jr. From Cape Charles to Cape Fear, The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993.


The Secrets and Lies of the Vietnam War, Exposed in One Epic Document

Brandishing a captured Chinese machine gun, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara appeared at a televised news conference in the spring of 1965. The United States had just sent its first combat troops to South Vietnam, and the new push, he boasted, was further wearing down the beleaguered Viet Cong.

“In the past 4 1/2 years, the Viet Cong, the Communists, have lost 89,000 men,” he said. “You can see the heavy drain.”

That was a lie. From confidential reports, McNamara knew the situation was “bad and deteriorating” in the South. “The VC have the initiative,” the information said. “Defeatism is gaining among the rural population, somewhat in the cities, and even among the soldiers.”

Lies like McNamara’s were the rule, not the exception, throughout America’s involvement in Vietnam. The lies were repeated to the public, to Congress, in closed-door hearings, in speeches and to the press. The real story might have remained unknown if, in 1967, McNamara had not commissioned a secret history based on classified documents — which came to be known as the Pentagon Papers.

By then, he knew that even with nearly 500,000 U.S. troops in theater, the war was at a stalemate. He created a research team to assemble and analyze Defense Department decision-making dating back to 1945. This was either quixotic or arrogant. As secretary of defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara was an architect of the war and implicated in the lies that were the bedrock of U.S. policy.

Daniel Ellsberg, an analyst on the study, eventually leaked portions of the report to The New York Times, which published excerpts in 1971. The revelations in the Pentagon Papers infuriated a country sick of the war, the body bags of young Americans, the photographs of Vietnamese civilians fleeing U.S. air attacks and the endless protests and counterprotests that were dividing the country as nothing had since the Civil War.

The lies revealed in the papers were of a generational scale, and, for much of the American public, this grand deception seeded a suspicion of government that is even more widespread today.

Officially titled “Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force,” the papers filled 47 volumes, covering the administrations of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Johnson. Their 7,000 pages chronicled, in cold, bureaucratic language, how the United States got itself mired in a long, costly war in a small Southeast Asian country of questionable strategic importance.

They are an essential record of the first war the United States lost. For modern historians, they foreshadow the mindset and miscalculations that led the United States to fight the “forever wars” of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The original sin was the decision to support the French rulers in Vietnam. President Harry S. Truman subsidized their effort to take back their Indochina colonies. The Vietnamese nationalists were winning their fight for independence under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, a Communist. Ho had worked with the United States against Japan in World War II, but, in the Cold War, Washington recast him as the stalking horse for Soviet expansionism.

U.S. intelligence officers in the field said that was not the case, that they had found no evidence of a Soviet plot to take over Vietnam, much less Southeast Asia. As one State Department memo put it, “If there is a Moscow-directed conspiracy in Southeast Asia, Indochina is an anomaly.”

But with an eye on China, where the Communist Mao Zedong had won the civil war, President Dwight D. Eisenhower said defeating Vietnam’s Communists was essential “to block further Communist expansion in Asia.” If Vietnam became Communist, then the countries of Southeast Asia would fall like dominoes.

This belief in this domino theory was so strong that the United States broke with its European allies and refused to sign the 1954 Geneva Accords ending the French war. Instead, the United States continued the fight, giving full backing to Ngo Dinh Diem, the autocratic, anti-Communist leader of South Vietnam. Gen. J. Lawton Collins wrote from Vietnam, warning Eisenhower that Diem was an unpopular and incapable leader and should be replaced. If he was not, Collins wrote, “I recommend re-evaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast Asia.”

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles disagreed, writing in a cable included in the Pentagon Papers, “We have no other choice but continue our aid to Vietnam and support of Diem.”

Nine years and billions of American dollars later, Diem was still in power, and it fell to Kennedy to solve the long-predicted problem.

After facing down the Soviet Union in the Berlin crisis, Kennedy wanted to avoid any sign of Cold War fatigue and easily accepted McNamara’s counsel to deepen the U.S. commitment to Saigon. The secretary of defense wrote in one report, “The loss of South Vietnam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the Free World.”

The president increased U.S. military advisers tenfold and introduced helicopter missions. In return for the support, Kennedy wanted Diem to make democratic reforms. Diem refused.

A popular uprising in South Vietnam, led by Buddhist clerics, followed. Fearful of losing power as well, South Vietnamese generals secretly received American approval to overthrow Diem. Despite official denials, U.S. officials were deeply involved.

“Beginning in August of 1963, we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts …,” the Pentagon Papers revealed. “We maintained clandestine contact with them throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans.”

The coup ended with Diem’s killing and a deepening of American involvement in the war. As the authors of the papers concluded, “Our complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our commitment.”

Three weeks later, Kennedy was assassinated, and the Vietnam issue fell to Johnson.

He had officials secretly draft a resolution for Congress to grant him the authority to fight in Vietnam without officially declaring war.

Missing was a pretext, a small-bore “Pearl Harbor” moment. That came Aug. 4, 1964, when the White House announced that the North Vietnamese had attacked the USS Maddox in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. This “attack,” though, was anything but unprovoked aggression. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the head of U.S. forces in Vietnam, had commanded the South Vietnamese military while they staged clandestine raids on North Vietnamese islands. North Vietnamese PT boats fought back and had “mistaken Maddox for a South Vietnamese escort vessel,” according to a report. (Later investigations showed the attack never happened.)

Testifying before the Senate, McNamara lied, denying any American involvement in the Tonkin Gulf attacks: “Our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of any South Vietnamese actions, if there were any.”

Three days after the announcement of the “incident,” the administration persuaded Congress to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to approve and support “the determination of the president, as commander in chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” — an expansion of the presidential power to wage war that is still used regularly. Johnson won the 1964 election in a landslide.

Seven months later, he sent combat troops to Vietnam without declaring war, a decision clad in lies. The initial deployment of 20,000 troops was described as “military support forces” under a “change of mission” to “permit their more active use” in Vietnam. Nothing new.

As the Pentagon Papers later showed, the Defense Department also revised its war aims: “70 percent to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat … 20 percent to keep South Vietnam (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands, 10 percent to permit the people of South Vietnam to enjoy a better, freer way of life.”

Westmoreland considered the initial troop deployment a stopgap measure and requested 100,000 more. McNamara agreed. On July 20, 1965, he wrote in a memo that even though “the U.S. killed-in-action might be in the vicinity of 500 a month by the end of the year,” the general’s overall strategy was “likely to bring about a success in Vietnam.”

As the Pentagon Papers later put it, “Never again while he was secretary of defense would McNamara make so optimistic a statement about Vietnam — except in public.”

Fully disillusioned at last, McNamara argued in a 1967 memo to the president that more of the same — more troops, more bombing — would not win the war. In an about-face, he suggested that the United States declare victory and slowly withdraw.

And in a rare acknowledgment of the suffering of the Vietnamese people, he wrote, “The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one.”

Johnson was furious and soon approved increasing the U.S. troop commitment to nearly 550,000. By year’s end, he had forced McNamara to resign, but the defense secretary had already commissioned the Pentagon Papers.

In 1968, Johnson announced that he would not run for reelection Vietnam had become his Waterloo. Nixon won the White House on the promise to bring peace to Vietnam. Instead, he expanded the war by invading Cambodia, which convinced Daniel Ellsberg that he had to leak the secret history.

After The New York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers on Sunday, June 13, 1971, the nation was stunned. The response ranged from horror to anger to disbelief. There was furor over the betrayal of national secrets. Opponents of the war felt vindicated. Veterans, especially those who had served multiple tours in Vietnam, were pained to discover that U.S. officials knew the war had been a failed proposition nearly from the beginning.

Convinced that Ellsberg posed a threat to Nixon’s reelection campaign, the White House approved an illegal break-in at the Beverly Hills, California, office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, hoping to find embarrassing confessions on file. The burglars — known as the Plumbers — found nothing, and got away undetected. The following June, when another such crew broke into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate complex in Washington, they were caught.

The North Vietnamese mounted a final offensive, captured Saigon and won the war in April 1975. Three years later, Vietnam invaded Cambodia — another Communist country — and overthrew the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime. That was the sole country Communist Vietnam ever invaded, forever undercutting the domino theory — the war’s foundational lie.


Civil War Sub Development

Today it is known that a lot of work was done on developing and deploying submarines on both sides of the Civil War. There is very little information available concerning these Civil War submarines to be found in official record. Kāpēc? To hide new developments from the enemy?

But the main reason is much more entertaining. Submarines were considered practically illegal.

Therefore, most submarine development carried on in the Confederacy was done under the direction of the Secret Service rather than under the direction of the Navy. As the war was coming to a close most records of southern submarine development were destroyed to protect those that had taken part. It was feared that anyone involved in the development of "Infernal Machines," as northerners were so fond of calling subs, would face harsher treatment than the average Confederate rebel.

This makes the Union's involvement in submarine development all the more entertaining. While publicly decrying undersea warfare, the U.S. Navy maintained its own submarine development and building program. For consistency, the Official Record from this time shows almost no involvement in such a program, and when a mention does appear it is accompanied by repeated calls for secrecy on the matter.

For these reasons, most of what we know about Civil War submarines does not come from official government records on the matter.

We do know, however, that the overall goal on the two sides was somewhat different. Most Union submarine development was done with the goal of clearing obstructed harbors, while most Confederate submarine development was done with the goal of breaking up the Union blockade.

There were several other Union subs developed, of which little is known. Although, at one point USN Admiral Dahlgren asked for the services of "3-4 submarines" to help clear Charleston Harbor of obstructions. This means the Admiral was either out of his mind, or the Union had several harbor clearing subs at their disposal. While there is no officially recorded response to this request, shortly thereafter, Confederates reported sighting a sub being towed into Charleston harbor and sliding beneath the surface.

A couple other northern subs that deserve mention, even though they did not see service in the civil war, are the Intelligent Whale un Explorer. There is not room here for their stories but perhaps we will get to them later.

Meanwhile, in the south there were many efforts underway to build a sub to break up the Union blockade. First, there were "David" boats: long, narrow steamboats which ran awash with snorkel type smoke stacks and air intakes. These boats were largely ineffectual and not truly submarines.

As early as 1861 there were reports of experimental subs being tested in the harbors at New Orleans, Mobile, and Savannah. There were many different subs developed in the Confederacy, but the work of William Cheeney and Horace Hunley is most well known.

Cheeney worked in Richmond and had his subs attempting attacks as early as 1861. He continued to work on producing improved subs throughout the Civil War.

Hunley worked mainly in Mobile, Alabama, where he and his team built the Pioneer, Pioneer II, un Hunley. It is believed that they may have built and tested other subs as well. Interesanti, ka Pionieris was the first submarine to be granted a letter of marque by the Confederate government. This basically allowed its private owners to legally attack enemy ships.

Overall, there is enough information available for historians to surmise that there must have been more than 20 submarines, from both sides, developed throughout the American Civil War.


Unraveling the historical lies on the Philippine-American War

LAST February 4 was the 122nd anniversary of the first shot fired during the Philippine-American War. As bad as the shooting war was the propaganda war that the Americans conducted on the Filipinos that all but obliterated this conflict in the memory of many until today. The three-year war, apart from its other effects, killed about 200,000 Filipinos. We only remember the so-called legacies of education and governance, which, although not small achievements for the Americans, also cast over our nation a culture of dependency that still affects us today.

One lie that was told to us was that the conflict was an insurrection, meaning that legally, under the Treaty of Paris, our revolutionaries were mere rebels under a nation that had legitimate jurisdiction over them. Hence it was called “The Philippine Insurrection against the United States.” But we already had a national revolutionary government since the beginning of the revolution in 1896, which was headed eventually by General Emilio Aguinaldo who proclaimed Philippine independence in 1898 on account of the many victories the revolutionaries were already gaining against the Spaniards. That conflict was a war between two independent sovereign nations.

Another lie would be that it was the Filipinos who started that war, that we were the first one to fire a shot against the Americans on the night of Feb. 4, 1899. Hearing this disinformation in the middle of the debate in the US Congress to ratify the Treaty of Paris, the undecided swung towards the pro-imperialists and ratified the treaty. Turns out the first shot came from the side of the volunteers of the United States.

But before that important incident, it was made to appear that the Americans did not have any intention to occupy the Philippines.

Three important original primary documents recently surfaced at the Leon Gallery that showed the duplicity that characterized the Americans’ dealings with the Philippine revolutionary government.

The first is a letter from the American General Wesley Merritt, general of the division of the Department of the Pacific and the 8th Army Corps, on Aug. 20, 1898 (curiously written by various scribes in Spanish), addressed to “General en Jefe de las Fuerzas Filipinas” but signed by him, proposing that Manila and environs should be jointly placed under the jurisdiction of both the American and Filipino forces.

This was seven days after the mock Battle of Manila when the Americans took over Intramuros after a fake battle with the Spaniards and giving the impression of recognizing the Filipinos’ revolutionary government, which at that time was trying to create a nation, the first time in 333 years that they could breathe the little air of freedom.

But a 22-page typewritten US Navy official report dated Nov. 23, 1898, tells of the Americans’ ship, Monadnock, reconnaissance of Filipino positions around Northern Luzon. This was happening even as the revolutionary government in Malolos had convened a Congress that was drafting the constitution that would create the “first constitutional democratic republic in Asia.” Previously published by historian Gregorio Zaide in his Documentary Sources in Philippine History, the US Navy report assessed the intelligence and education of the native Filipinos, and analyzes relations between the rich and poor, the military towards the civil class, church influences, the popularity of the aspiration for independence, attitudes towards the US, and how well were the Filipinos prepared to wage war on them.

And while President Emilio Aguinaldo continued to hope that America would recognize our soon-to-be-born Republic, on Nov. 30, 1898, Admiral George Dewey, the so-called “Hero of the Battle of Manila Bay,” signed a typewritten letter on the stationery of the “United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station” at the famous ship Olympia, addressed to Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis, the military governor in Manila: “It is to be hoped that we will soon receive instructions from Washington which will enable us to take some action in the premises. My ships are ready to move at a moment’s notice, and I hope that your troops will also be prepared, as in my judgment Iloilo and Cebu should be occupied at the earliest possible moment.”

The letter referred to their knowledge of a shipment of arms coming for the Philippine revolutionaries: “It appears to me also that the best way to prevent the importation of arms into the North is to occupy Aparri, and there will be vessels ready to convoy your troops whenever they can move.”

“I agree with you that the proposed shipment of arms will probably be attempted from Shanghai, but I hope we will be able to block that game.”

All of this proved that the decision to occupy the Philippines was taken despite the promises of the consuls Pratt and Wildman to Aguinaldo, and even before President William McKinley fell on his knees to pray for light and guidance on whether to annex the Philippines, and God supposedly answered in the affirmative.


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