Emendingenas kauja, 1796. gada 19. oktobris

Emendingenas kauja, 1796. gada 19. oktobris


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Emendingenas kauja, 1796. gada 19. oktobris

Atkāpšanās pie Reinas
Apvidus
Austrijas nostājas un plāni
Franču plāns
Kauja
20. oktobris

Emmendingenas kauja (1796. gada 19. oktobris) bija Austrijas uzvara, kas novērsa jebkādu iespēju, ka ģenerāļa Moreau Reinas un Mozeles armija varētu būt spējusi saglabāt savu vietu Reinas austrumu krastā, atkāpjoties no plkst. Vācijas dienvidos.

1796. gada vasarā franči uzsāka divpusēju iebrukumu Vācijā. Moreau sasniedza Minhenes pievārti, pirms atklāja, ka Jourdans ir uzvarēts Ambergā un Vircburgā un atkāpjas atpakaļ Reinā. Moreau sāka lēnu atkāpšanos atpakaļ uz rietumiem, aiz sevis sekojot Austrijas armijai ģenerāļa Latūra vadībā. Moro vēl nebija gatavs pilnībā atteikties no savas kampaņas, un 2. oktobrī pagriezās atpakaļ un nodarīja dārgu sakāvi Latoram Biberahā, taču erchercogs Čārlzs tagad sāka apdraudēt savu aizmuguri, un Moro bija spiests turpināt atkāpšanos.

Atkāpšanās pie Reinas

Dienu pēc uzvaras Biberahā Moro joprojām bija potenciāli bīstamā stāvoklī. Reinas un Mozeles armija atradās astoņdesmit jūdzes uz austrumiem no Reinas ielejas relatīvās drošības, Donavas dienvidu krastā. Lai sasniegtu Reinu, viņiem būtu jāšķērso divas kalnu grēdas - Alb un Melnais mežs. Latūra armija tika piekauta Biberahā, bet netika iznīcināta, un joprojām sekoja viņu atkāpšanai. Ģenerāļi Nauendorfs un Petrašs bija apvienojušies Heingengenā, Albas ziemeļu nogāzēs. Arī austriešiem bija karaspēks tieši uz ziemeļiem no Strasbūras Reinas austrumu krastos, un Jourdana armijas galīgā sakāve Altenkirhenē (19. septembrī) bija atbrīvojusi hercogu Kārli pārcelties uz dienvidiem ar pastiprinājumu.

Moreau cerēja šķērsot Švarcvaldi, izmantojot Kincigas ieleju, kas viņu būtu izvedusi Reinas ielejā netālu no Strasbūras, taču šis maršruts viņam tagad bija slēgts. Tā vietā viņš nolēma izmantot Höllental. Šī ieleja šķērso vienu no augstākajiem Švarcvaldes posmiem, kas atrodas divdesmit jūdzes uz ziemeļiem no Šveices robežas, sākot no Hinterzarten austrumos līdz Kirchzarten un Buchenbach kalnu vidū. Pēc tam plašāka ieleja iet uz rietumiem līdz Freiburgai pie Breisgau, Reinas līdzenuma malā.

Šis ceļš drīz atstāja armiju diezgan izstieptu. Kamēr lielākā daļa armijas pārcēlās uz Rīdlingenu, desmit jūdzes uz rietumiem no Biberahas pie Donavas, avansardze šķērsoja Alb un ieņēma Villengenu un Rotveitu, pretī plaisas starp Alb un Melno mežu dienvidu galam. Armijas kreisais spārns sekoja viņiem pāri un ieņēma pozīciju Rotveitā, vērsts uz ziemeļiem, lai pasargātu no jebkādiem Nauendorfa gājieniem. Armijas labais spārns pārcēlās uz Tuttlingenu, Albas dienvidu galā, un pagriezās uz austrumiem, lai stātos pretī Latoram.

Armijas centrs Saint-Cyr vadībā piespieda Höllental pāreju. Abi Austrijas bataljoni, kas apsargāja pāreju, pulkveža Aspres vadībā bija spiesti atkāpties no ielejas un uz Emendingenu, sešas jūdzes uz ziemeļiem no Freiburgas im Breisgau. Svētais Kirrs 12. oktobrī ienāca Freiburgā, un pārējā armija tuvākajās dienās sekoja pāri pārejai. Smagākā tehnika devās dienvidu virzienā un devās uz Huningue, gandrīz pie Šveices robežas, ko aizsargāja Tharreau un Paillard brigādes, kuras cīnījās ar vairākām nelielām aizmugures apsardzes darbībām pret ģenerāļa Froeliča vieglajiem karaspēkiem.

Moro nākamais mērķis bija atvērt sakarus ar nocietināto nometni Kēlā, iepretim Strasbūrai, kur viņš jūnijā pirmo reizi bija šķērsojis Reinu. Tā vietā, lai atkārtoti šķērsotu Reinu un dotos augšup Francijas valdītajā Rietumu krastā uz Strasbūru, viņš nolēma pacīnīties uz augšu austrumu krastā.

Apvidus

Emmendingenas kauja notika Elzas ielejā. Šī ieleja līkločiem iet cauri Švarcvaldei, pirms izceļas Reinas līdzenumā uz ziemeļiem no Freiburgas Breisgau. Cīņā iesaistītais ielejas posms iet uz dienvidrietumiem caur kalniem no Elzahas, caur Bleibahu un Valdkirhu. Tieši uz dienvidrietumiem no Valdkirhas upe izplūst no kalniem un pagriežas pa labi, plūstot uz ziemeļrietumiem Reinas virzienā, bet Švarcvaldi-pa labi. Šis upes posms šķērso Emmendingenu un sasniedz Rīgelu. 1796. gadā upe pagriezās uz ziemeļiem pie Rīgeles un skrēja paralēli Švarcvaldei, līdz kaut kādā veidā uz ziemeļiem sasniedza Reinu. Rīgels atrodas šaurā spraugā starp Švarcvaldi un izolētu vulkānisko kalnu atsegšanu, kas pazīstama kā Kaiserstuhl.

Austrijas nostājas un plāni

Moro izredzes gūt panākumus šajā projektā ar katru dienu pasliktinājās. 15. oktobrī erchercogs Čārlzs sasniedza Ofenburgu, piecpadsmit jūdzes uz dienvidaustrumiem no Kēlas, kur pievienojās Petrašam un Nauenburgas kreisajam spārnam. Latūrs 17. oktobrī parādījās no Kincigas ielejas un 18. oktobrī sasniedza Mālbergas nometni, kas atrodas piecpadsmit jūdzes tālāk uz dienvidiem. Kondē un Frēlihs atradās Neištadē, Höllentāla austrumu galā, un ģenerālis Volfs atradās nedaudz tālāk uz dienvidiem, pie Valdšutas. Erchercogs sākotnēji vēlējās 18. oktobrī sākt uzbrukumu francūžiem, taču Latūra vīriem vajadzēja dienu, lai atgūtuos no gājiena, un tāpēc uzbrukums tika atlikts uz nākamo dienu.

Erchercogs sadalīja savu armiju četrās kolonnās. Ģenerālis Nauendorfs atradās Elzas augšējā ielejā ar 6000 vīru (8 bataljoni un 14 eskadriļas). Viņam vajadzēja virzīties uz dienvidrietumiem uz Valdkirhu.

Feldzeugmeister Vilhelmam Grafam Vārtenslebenam ar 8500 vīriem (12 bataljoniem un 23 eskadroniem) bija jāvirzās uz dienvidiem pāri Švarcvaldes pakājē un jāuzņem Elzas tilts pie Emendingenas.

Ģenerālim Latoram ar 6000 vīru (8 bataljoni un 15 eskadriļas) bija arī jāšķērso Švarcvaldes pakājes caur Heimbahu un Malterdingenu (uz austrumiem no Rīgeles) un jānoķer Kendringenas tilts, pusceļā starp Rīgelu un Emendingenu.

Fīrstenbergas princis ģenerālis Karls Aloizs turēja Kenzingenu 2-3 jūdzes uz ziemeļiem no Rīgeles sākotnējā Elzas gājienā. Viņam tika pavēlēts rīkot demonstrācijas pret Rīgelu un aizsargāt Rustu, Kappelu un Grafenhauzenu uz ziemeļiem no galvenās Austrijas pozīcijas.

Tālāk uz dienvidiem ģenerālim Froelicham un Kondē princim vajadzēja piespiest ģenerāli Ferino un francūžus tieši Stiega ielejā.

Franču plāns

Moreau uzbrukuma plāns bija gandrīz precīzs Austrijas plāna spoguļattēls. Ģenerālim Delmasam vajadzēja uzbrukt Rīgelam, kur viņš sadursies ar Fīrstenbergas princi.

Ģenerālim Beauputam vajadzēja ieņemt Malterdingenes (3 jūdzes uz ziemeļrietumiem no Emendingenas) un Kondringenas augstumus. Viņš stātos pretī Latūra kolonnai.

Pirmā centra nodaļa bija turēt Emendingenu, kur tam uzbruks Vārtenslēns.

Saint-Cyr ar centra otro nodaļu vajadzēja uzbrukt uz ziemeļaustrumiem augšup pa Elzas ieleju virzienā uz Bleibahu, kur viņš vispirms iesitīs galvu Nauendorfā.

Uzbrukumā tiktu iesaistīts tikai viņa armijas centrs, jo ģenerālis Desaix ar kreiso spārnu atradās uz dienvidiem, bet ģenerālis Ferino ar labo sargāja pārejas pāri Švarcvaldei. Tā rezultātā Moro pārspēja erchercogs, lai gan uzbrukumā bija iesaistīti tikai aptuveni 20 000 austriešu.

Kauja

Cīņas kalnos gāja austriešu ceļu. Rītausmā Saint-Cyr sāka virzīties augšup pa Elzas ieleju, bet Nauendorfs gatavojās virzīties lejup pa ieleju. Saint-Cyr nolēma nosūtīt otru nelielu kolonnu pāri kalniem uz ielejas austrumiem, tēmējot uz Simonsvaldes ciematu, kas atrodas sānu ielejā. Viņš cerēja, ka šis spēks trāpīs Nauendorfam pa kreisi un piespiedīs viņu izstāties no Bleibaha. Diemžēl francūžiem Nauendorfs bija novietojis spārnus augstumos līdzās Elzas ielejai, un Sen-Kirisa vīri bija Austrijas strēlnieku slazdā. Elzas ielejas otrā pusē vairāk austriešu strēlnieku sasniedza dominējošo stāvokli Kolnau, no kura paveras skats uz Valdkirhu. Saint-Cyr bija spiests atcelt Bleibach avansu un atkāpās uz Waldkirch. Nauendorfs turpināja viņu bīdīt, un Saint-Cyr bija spiests atkāpties vēl divas jūdzes līdz Denzlingenai.

Apmēram pusdienlaikā Latūra divas kolonnas uzbruka Bīpujam Matterdingenā. Beaupuy tika nogalināts cīņas sākumā, un neskaidrību dēļ viņa divīzija nesaņēma pavēli atkāpties pa Elzu līdz Wasser, uz dienvidiem no Emendingenas.

Austrijas centrā esošais Vārtenslebens visu dienu veltīja sev iespēju cīnīties līdz Emmendingenai. Divas viņa kolonnas pacēla franču strēlnieki, kas ievietoti Landeck mežā, divas jūdzes uz ziemeļiem no Emendingenas, un viņš pats bija smagi ievainots. Franči galu galā bija spiesti atkāpties vēlā dienas laikā, kad Vārtenslebenas trešā kolonna draudēja pārspēt viņu tiesības. Pēc tam franči atkāpās pāri upei, iznīcinot tiltus aiz tiem.

Dienas beigās Moreau bija ļoti sliktā stāvoklī. Delmas atradās Rīgelē un Endingenā, Kaiserstuhl ziemeļaustrumu stūrī. Saint-Cyr labās puses atradās aiz Denzlingenas, bet kreisās-Unterreute. Franču centrs atradās Nimburgā, pusceļā starp Riegel un Unterreute. Francijas līnija bija vērsta uz ziemeļaustrumiem pret austriešiem. Naktī no 19. uz 20. oktobri austrieši remontēja tiltu pie Emendingenas, un līdz 20. oktobra rītam erchercogs tika apmeties netālu no Denzlingenes.

20. oktobris

20. oktobrī Moreau beidzot atteicās no jebkādiem plāniem virzīties augšup Reinas austrumu krastā. Desaix tika pavēlēts šķērsot Reinu pie Brisach (Kaiserstuhl dienvidu galā un desmit jūdzes uz rietumiem no Freiburgas) un virzīties uz ziemeļiem Strasbūras un Kēlas virzienā.

Franču centrs atkāpās no visattīstītākajām pozīcijām un ieņēma jaunu pozīciju aiz Dresiam (straume, kas tek no Freiburgas uz ziemeļiem līdz Rīgelei). Ferino ar armijas labo spārnu vēl atradās Senpjēras ielejā, un, ja franči zaudētu Freiburgu, viņš būtu iesprostots starp Kondē un Froeliču ielejā un erchercogu līdzenumā.

Franči pieturējās gar Dresiamu tik ilgi, lai ļautu Ferino sasniegt drošību. Condé un Froelich bija tuvu aiz muguras, un, atklājot uguni uz francūžiem Freiburgā, Saint-Cyr beidzot bija spiests atkāpties. Tālāk uz ziemeļrietumiem Laturs ceturtajā mēģinājumā cīnījās pāri Dresiam, un Fīrstenburgas princis sagūstīja Rīgelu.

Franči atkāpās ap Pfaffenweiler augstumu un tad atkāpās uz tiltu Huningue, netālu no Bāzeles. 22. oktobrī Moreau sasniedza Šliengenu, kas atrodas desmit jūdzes uz ziemeļiem no Huningue, un nolēma izveidot stendu, lai aptvertu savu atkāpšanos pāri upei.

Napoleona mājas lapa | Grāmatas par Napoleona kariem Tēmas rādītājs: Napoleona kari


Emendingenas kauja, 1796. gada 19. oktobris - vēsture

Emmendingenas kaujā 1796. gada 19. oktobrī Francijas Rinas un Mozeles armija Žana Viktora Marī Moro vadībā cīnījās ar Augšreinas pirmo koalīcijas armiju, kuru vadīja Teshenes hercogs hercogs Čārlzs. Emendingena atrodas pie Elzas upes Bādenē-Virtembergā, Vācijā, uz ziemeļiem no Freiburgas im Breisgau. Darbība notika Pirmās koalīcijas kara laikā, kas bija Francijas revolucionāro karu pirmais posms. Pēc vasaras parošanās starp abām pusēm francūži jau atkāpās caur Švarcvaldi uz Reinu. Ciešā vajāšanā austrieši piespieda franču komandieri sadalīt savus spēkus, lai viņš trijos punktos varētu šķērsot Reinu, izmantojot tiltus pie Kēlas, Breisahas un Hüningenas. Tomēr līdz septembra vidum austrieši kontrolēja pieejas pārejām pie Breisahas un Kēlas. Moreau joprojām vēlējās, lai puse savas armijas tuvotos austriešiem pie Kēlas. Emmendingenas nelīdzenais reljefs sarežģīja cīņas, kas ļāva Habsburgas spēkiem uzbrukt Francijas karaspēkam un bloķēt jebkādu eju pret Kēllu lietainā un aukstā laikā, vēl vairāk kavēja abu pušu centienus, pārvēršot straumes un straumes straujās ūdens straumēs. un padarot brauktuves slidenas. Cīņa bija sīva, kaujā gāja bojā divi ģenerāļi, viens no katras puses. Habsburgas panākumi Emendingenā piespieda francūžus atteikties no plāniem par trīs vai pat divpusēju izstāšanos. Franči turpināja atkāpšanos caur Švarcvaldes kalnu pilsētām uz dienvidiem, kur armijas piecas dienas vēlāk cīnījās pie Šliengenas kaujas.

Sākotnēji Eiropas valdnieki uzskatīja Francijas revolūciju par strīdu starp Francijas karali un viņa pavalstniekiem, nevis uz kaut ko, kurā viņiem vajadzētu iejaukties. Revolucionārajai retorikai kļūstot arvien spēcīgākai, viņi paziņoja, ka Eiropas monarhu intereses ir vienotas ar Luija XVI un viņa ģimenes interesēm, šī Pillnicas deklarācija (1791. gada 27. augusts) draudēja ar divdomīgām, bet diezgan nopietnām sekām, ja kaut kas ar to notiktu. Karaliskā ģimene. Revolucionāru stāvoklis kļuva arvien grūtāks. Apvienojot savas problēmas starptautiskajās attiecībās, franču emigranti turpināja satraukties par atbalstu pretrevolūcijai. Visbeidzot, 1792. gada 20. aprīlī Francijas Nacionālais konvents pasludināja karu Austrijai. Šajā Pirmās koalīcijas karā (1792–1798) Francija nostājās pret lielāko daļu Eiropas valstu, kurām ar viņu bija kopīgas sauszemes vai ūdens robežas, kā arī Portugāli un Osmaņu impēriju. Timotijs Blanings. '' Francijas revolucionārie kari '', Ņujorka: Oxford University Press, 1998, 41. – 59. Neskatoties uz dažām uzvarām 1792. gadā, līdz 1793. gada sākumam Francija bija krīzes situācijā: Francijas spēki tika izstumti no Beļģijas, Francijas karalim tikko tika izpildīts nāvessods, un Vendē notika sacelšanās par iesaukšanu un plaši izplatīto Civilās konstitūcijas aizvainojumu. no garīdzniekiem. Francijas Republikas armijas bija traucējumu stāvoklī, un problēmas kļuva vēl akūtākas pēc masveida iesaukšanas - “levée en masse” - ieviešanas, kas piesātināja jau tā nelaimē nonākušo armiju ar tūkstošiem analfabētu, neapmācītu vīriešu. Francūžiem 1795. gada Reinas kampaņa izrādījās īpaši postoša, lai gan viņi bija guvuši zināmus panākumus citos kara teātros, tostarp Pireneju karā (1793–1795). Pirmās koalīcijas armijās ietilpa dažādu valstu impērijas kontingenti un kājnieki un kavalērija, kuru skaits sasniedza aptuveni 125 000 (ieskaitot trīs autonomu korpusu), kas ir ievērojams spēks pēc astoņpadsmitā gadsimta standartiem, bet mērens spēks pēc revolucionāro un Napoleona standartiem. kari. Kopumā virspavēlnieka erchercoga Kārļa karaspēks stiepās no Šveices līdz Ziemeļjūrai un Dagoberts Zigmunds fon Vurmsers no Šveices un Itālijas robežas līdz Adrijas jūrai. Habsburgu karaspēks sastāvēja no lielākās armijas, bet "plānas baltas līnijas" Ginters E. Rotenbergs "Habsburgu armija Napoleona karos (1792–1815)". '' Militārās lietas '', 37: 1 (1973. gada februāris), 1. un 5. lpp., 5. lpp. 2 citēts. koalīcijas kājnieki nevarēja pietiekami dziļi aptvert teritoriju no Bāzeles līdz Frankfurtei, lai izturētu pretinieku spiedienu. Salīdzinot ar Francijas pārklājumu, Čārlzam bija puse karaspēka, lai aptvertu fronti, kas stiepās no Renhenes pie Bāzeles līdz Bingenai. Turklāt viņš bija koncentrējis lielāko daļu sava spēka, kuru vadīja grāfs Baillet Latour, starp Karlsrūi un Darmštati, kur Reinas un Mainas satekā notika uzbrukums, visticamāk, upes piedāvāja vārtus uz Vācijas austrumu štatiem un galu galā uz Vīni, ar labiem tiltiem, kas šķērso samērā skaidri definētu upes krastu. Uz ziemeļiem Vilhelma fon Vārtenslebena autonomais korpuss aptvēra līniju starp Maincu un Gīsenu. Austrijas armija sastāvēja no profesionāļiem, daudzi tika atvesti no pierobežas reģioniem Balkānos, un iesaucamie bija iesaukti no Imperiālajiem lokiem.

Cīņas atsākšana: 1796

1796. gada janvārī francūži un Pirmās koalīcijas dalībnieki noslēdza pamieru, izbeidzot 1795. gada Reinas kampaņu, ko viņi saprata, ka tā ir īslaicīga. Theodore Ayrault Dodge, '' Karadarbība Napoleona laikmetā: revolucionārie kari pret pirmo koalīciju Ziemeļeiropā un Itālijas kampaņa, 1789. -1797. '' Leonaurs, 2011. 286. – 287. Blanning, 41. – 59. . Šī vienošanās ilga līdz 1796. gada 20. maijam, kad austrieši paziņoja, ka tas beigsies 31. maijā. Koalīcijas Lejasreinas armijā bija 90 000 karavīru, pārsvarā Habsburgas un '' Reichsarmee '' (Imperiālie) karavīri no Svētās Romas impērijas štatiem. 20 000 vīru labais spārns Virtembergas hercoga Ferdinanda Frederika Augusta vadībā stāvēja Reinas austrumu krastā aiz Zig upes, vērojot Francijas placdarmu Diseldorfā. Maincas cietokšņa un Ērenbreitšteinas cietokšņa garnizoni saskaitīja vēl 10 000. Pārējo Habsburgu un koalīcijas spēku daļu Čārlzs izvietoja rietumu krastā aiz Nahes. Dagoberts Zigmunds fon Vurmsers vadīja 80 000 cilvēku lielo Reinas upes armiju. Tās labais spārns ieņēma Kaiserslauternu rietumu krastā, bet kreisais spārns Antona Štáraja, Mihaela fon Froliha un Kondē prinča Luisa Džozefa vadībā sargāja Reinu no Manheimas līdz Šveicei. Sākotnējā koalīcijas stratēģija bija sagūstīt Trīru un izmantot pozīciju Rietumu krastā, lai pēc tam streikotu pret katru Francijas armiju. Tomēr Vīnē pienāca ziņas par Bonaparta panākumiem. Pārskatot situāciju, Aula padome deva hercogam Čārlzam pavēli abām Austrijas armijām un lika viņam noturēties un nosūtīja Vurmseru uz Itāliju ar 25 000 papildspēku. Vurmsera un viņa karaspēka zaudējums ievērojami vājināja koalīcijas spēkus. Francijas pusē 80 000 cilvēku Sambre-et-Meuse armija turēja Reinas rietumu krastu līdz Nahe un pēc tam uz dienvidrietumiem līdz Sankt Vendelei. Armijas kreisajā flangā Žanam Baptistei Klēberam bija 22 000 karavīru iesakņojusies nometnē Diseldorfā. Rhin-et-Mozelle armijas labais spārns atradās aiz Reinas no Hüningenas uz ziemeļiem, tā centrs atradās gar Kvihes upi netālu no Landau un kreisais spārns stiepās uz rietumiem virzienā uz Sārbrikeni. Pjērs Marija Bartelemijs Ferino vadīja Moreau labo spārnu, Luiss Dezakss komandēja centru un Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr vadīja kreiso spārnu. Ferino spārnu veidoja trīs kājnieku un kavalērijas divīzijas Fransuā Antuāna Luija Burjē un Anrī Fransuā Delaborda vadībā. Desaix pavēle ​​saskaitīja trīs divīzijas, kuras vadīja Mišels de Bīpuijs, Antuāns Gijoms Delmass un Čārlzs Antuāns Ksintrails. Saint-Cyr spārnā bija divas divīzijas, kuras komandēja Guillaume Philibert Duhesme un Taponier. Francijas grandiozais plāns paredzēja, ka divas franču armijas spiedās pret Vācijas štatu ziemeļu armiju malām, vienlaikus trešā armija tuvojās Vīnei caur Itāliju. Jourdana armija virzīsies uz dienvidaustrumiem no Diseldorfas, plānojot piesaistīt karaspēku un uzmanību sev, kas ļautu Moreau armijai vieglāk šķērsot Reinu starp Kēlu un Hüningenu. Saskaņā ar plānu Jourdana armija viltojās Manheimas virzienā, un Čārlzs ātri sadalīja savus karaspēkus. Moreau armija uzbruka tilta galvai pie Kēlas, kuru apsargāja 7000 imperatora karaspēka - karavīri, kas tajā pavasarī tika savervēti no Švābijas apļa politikas, nepieredzējuši un neapmācīti -, kas pārsteidzoši turēja placdarmu vairākas stundas, bet pēc tam atkāpās Rastatas virzienā. 23. - 24. jūnijā Moro pastiprināja placdarmu ar savu priekšējo aizsargu. Izstūmis impērijas miliciju no sava amata uz placdarma, viņa karaspēks netraucēti ielija Bādenē. Līdzīgi dienvidos pie Bāzeles Ferino kolonna ātri pārcēlās pāri upei un devās augšup pa Reinu pa Šveices un Vācijas krasta līniju, virzienā uz Konstances ezeru un Švarcvaldes dienvidu galā. Noraizējies, ka viņa piegādes līnijas tiks pārspīlētas, Čārlzs sāka atkāpšanos uz austrumiem. Šajā brīdī parādījās raksturīgā greizsirdība un konkurence starp ģenerāļiem. Moreau varēja pievienoties Jourdana armijai ziemeļos, bet viņš nedevās uz austrumiem, iegrūžot Čārlzu Bavārijā. Džourdans arī virzījās uz austrumiem, iebīdot Vārtenslebenas autonomo korpusu Ernestīnas hercogistē, un neviens ģenerālis nešķita gatavs apvienot savu flangu ar savu tautieti. Dodge, 292. – 293. Sekoja stratēģisku atkāpšanās, flangu un pārflanku manevru vasara. Abās pusēs divu armiju savienība - Vārtenslebena ar Čārlza vai Jourdana armija ar Moro - varēja sagraut opozīciju. Dodžs, 297. lpp. Vārtenslebens un Čārlzs vispirms apvienojās, un paisums pagriezās pret frančiem. Ar 25 000 savu labāko karaspēku erchercogs pārcēlās uz Donavas ziemeļu krastu pie Rēgensburgas un pārcēlās uz ziemeļiem, lai pievienotos savam kolēģim Vārtenslebenam. Jourdana armijas sakāve Ambergas, Vircburgas un Altenkirhenes cīņās ļāva Čārlzam pārvietot vairāk karaspēka uz dienvidiem. Nākamais kontakts notika 19. oktobrī Emmendingenā. J. Rikards
'' Emendingenas kauja ''
Kara vēsture
2009. gada 17. februāris. Skatīts 2014. gada 18. novembrī.

Emendingena atrodas Elzas ielejā, kas vijas caur Švarcvaldi. Elz izveido virkni piekārtu ieleju, kas izaicina lielu karaspēka daļu nokļūšanu lietainā laikā, kas vēl vairāk sarežģīja pāreju caur Elzas ieleju. Teritorija ap Riegel am Kaiserstuhl ir atzīmēta ar savu lielo un šaurajiem pārejas punktiem, kas lielā mērā ietekmēja kauju.

Labākā Francijas armijas daļa debukēja caur Hēlas ieleju. Desaix kreisajā spārnā bija deviņi bataljoni un 12 Rigēla Svētās Sūzanas divīzijas eskadriļas, kas atradās abos Elzas krastos. Pa labi starp Malterdingenu un Emendingenu Bībupu vadīja 12 bataljonu un 12 eskadronu divīziju. Tālāk pa labi, pie paša Emendingena un augstumos pie Heimbaha, stāvēja Sentkīrs ap to, kas stiepās uz Duhesmes divīziju (12 bataljoni un astoņas eskadras). Tālāk pa labi no tiem Elzas ielejā pie Valdkirhas stāvēja Amberta divīzija un Žirarda brigāde pie Zāringenas, apmēram jūdzi tālāk, Lekorbes brigāde stāvēja rezervē, un, stiepjoties uz ziemeļiem no turienes, apkārtnē klīda 14 000 cilvēku liela divīzija. Holzhausen (mūsdienās marta daļa, Breisgau). Šīs pozīcijas radīja aptuveni garu rindu. Lekorbes brigādes tālākajā pusē stāvēja Ferino 15 bataljoni un 16 eskadriļas, taču tās atradās krietni uz dienvidiem un austrumiem no Freiburgas im Breisgau, joprojām tramdot cauri kalniem. Visus bija apgrūtinājušas spēcīgas lietavas, zeme bija mīksta un slidena, un Reina un Elza bija applūdušas, tāpat kā daudzas pietekas. Tas palielināja uzbrukuma bīstamību, jo zirgi nevarēja labi nostiprināties. Johans Semjuels Eršs
'' Allgemeine enciklopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer folge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben ''
Leipciga, J. F. Gledičs, 1889., 64. – 66.lpp. Pret to stāvēja erchercoga spēki. Sasniedzot dažas jūdzes no Emendingenas, erchercogs sadalīja savus spēkus četrās kolonnās. Kolonnā Nauendorfā, Elzas augšējā daļā, bija astoņi bataljoni un 14 eskadriļas, kas virzījās uz dienvidrietumiem līdz Valdkirhei Vārtenslebenai, kur bija 12 bataljoni un 23 eskadras, kas virzījās uz dienvidiem, lai ieņemtu Elzas tiltu pie Emendingenas. Latoram ar 6000 vīriem bija jāšķērso pakājes caur Heimbahu un Malterdingenu un jāuzņem Kēndringenas tilts starp Rīgelu un Emendingenu, un kolonna Fīrstenberga turēja Kinzingenu, apmēram uz ziemeļiem no Rīgeles. Froliham un Kondē (Nauendorfa kolonnas daļa) tika uzdots saspiest Ferino un franču labo spārnu Stiega ielejā.

Pirmie, kas ieradās Emindingenā, francūži nodrošināja augstāko punktu Valdkirhā, kas pavēlēja kaimiņu ielejām, tajā laikā tika uzskatīts par militārās taktikas maksimumu, ka kalnu pavēle ​​dod kontroli pār ielejām. Līdz 19. oktobrim armijas saskārās viena ar otru Elzas krastā no Valdkirhas līdz Emendingenai. Līdz tam laikam Moro zināja, ka nevar doties uz Kēlu pa Reinas labo krastu, tāpēc nolēma šķērsot Reinu tālāk uz ziemeļiem, pie Breisahas. Tilts tur tomēr bija mazs, un visa viņa armija nevarēja iet garām, neradot sastrēgumu, tāpēc viņš nosūtīja tur šķērsot tikai kreiso spārnu, kuru komandēja Desaix. Arčibalds Alisons (sers Archibald Alison, 1. baronets) "Eiropas vēsture", ondons V. Blekvuds un dēli, 1835, 86. un ndash90. Rītausmā Saint-Cyr (franču labajā pusē) virzījās uz priekšu pa Elzas ieleju. Nauendorfs gatavojās pārvietot savus Habsburgas spēkus pa ieleju. Redzot to, Sen-Kirs nosūtīja nelielu kolonnu pāri kalniem uz austrumiem no galvenās ielejas, uz Simonsvaldes ciematu, kas atradās sānu ielejā. Viņš pavēlēja viņiem uzbrukt Nauendorfam pa kreisi un piespiest viņu atkāpties no Bleibaha. Paredzot to, Nauendorfs jau bija izvietojis vienības augstumos gar Elzas ieleju, no kurām austriešu šāvēji uzbruka Saint-Cyr vīriem. Elzas ielejas otrā pusē vairāk Habsburgas lielgabalnieku sasniedza Kolnau, no kuras paveras skats uz Valdkirhu, un no turienes viņi varēja apšaudīt Francijas spēkus. Cīņa bija ātra un nikna. Augstākās austriešu pozīcijas piespieda Saint-Cyr atcelt savu virzību uz Bleibachu un pat turpat atkāpties uz Valdkirhu, lai gan Nauendorfa vīri turpināja viņu uzmākties, un Saint-Cyr atkāpās, lai nodrošinātu relatīvu drošību Denzlingenā. Cīņas gāja ne labāk francūžiem pa kreisi. Dekaena uzlabotā apsardze devās uz priekšu, kaut arī piesardzīgi. Austrijas šāvēji apšaudīja kolonnu, un Dekaens nokrita no sava zirga, ievainots. Dekēna vietu kopā ar priekšsargu ieņēma Bovijs. Phipps, sēj. II, 380. un 385. lpp. Pusdienlaikā Latūrs atteicās no ierastās piesardzības un nosūtīja divas kolonnas, lai uzbruktu Beaupuy starp Malterdingenu un Höllental (Val d'Enfer), kā rezultātā izcēlās sīva apšaude. Pēc pavēles atkāpties gar Elzu Bībupijs tika nogalināts, un viņa nodaļa nesaņēma pavēli atkāpties, radot papildu zaudējumus francūžiem. Centrā franču strēlnieki, kas norīkoti Landeck mežā, uz ziemeļiem no Emmendingenas, noturēja divus Vārtenslebenas vienības, bet viņa trešais cīnījās par dubļainiem, gandrīz neizbraucamiem ceļiem. Vārtenslebena vīriem vajadzēja visu dienu, lai cīnītos līdz Emmendingenai, un šaušanas laikā Vārtenslebena kreiso roku sasita musketes bumba. Visbeidzot, dienas beigās ieradās Vārtenslebenas trešā kolonna, kas draudēja pārvarēt franču tiesības, un franči atkāpās pāri Elzas upei, iznīcinot tiltus aiz tiem. Alison, 86. lpp. Un ndash90. Phipps, sēj. II, 1. lpp. 278. Dienas cīņu beigās Moro spēki nostājās nedrošā stāvoklī. No kreisās uz labo pusi franči bija izstiepti gar robainu, pārtrauktu līniju apmēram. Dekaena divīzija stāvēja pie Rīgeles un Endingenas, Kaiserstuhl ziemeļaustrumu stūrī, un vairs nesniedza nekādu palīdzību lielākajai daļai Moreau spēku Moreau arī bija zaudējusi enerģisku un daudzsološu virsnieku Beaupuy. Labajā pusē Saint-Cyr divīzija stāvēja aiz Denzlingenas, bet pa kreisi stiepās līdz Unterreutei, no centra atdalījās arī plāna līnija-pie Nimburgas (netālu no Teningenas un Landekas), pusceļā starp Rīgelu un Unterreuti. Franču līnija bija vērsta uz ziemeļaustrumiem pret austriešiem, neraugoties uz Habsburgas panākumiem visas dienas garumā, koalīcijas spēki nespēja pārvarēt franču līniju, un līdz ar to franči varēja atkāpties samērā labā kārtībā uz dienvidiem.

Piezīmes, citāti un resursu saraksts alfabētiskā secībā

Resursu saraksts alfabētiskā secībā

* Elisone, Arčibalds (sers Arčibalds Elisons, 1. barons). '' Eiropas vēsture. '' Londona: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1835. *Blanning, Timothy. '' Francijas revolucionārie kari. '' Ņujorka: Oxford University Press, 1996, * Čārlzs, Austrijas erchercogs
'' Ausgewählte Schriften weiland seiner kaiserlichen Hoheit des Erzherzogs Carl von Österreich. ''
Vīne, V. Braumillers, 1893. – 94. . * Dodža, Teodors Ajolts. '' Karadarbība Napoleona laikmetā: revolucionārie kari pret pirmo koalīciju Ziemeļeiropā un Itālijas kampaņa, 1789. -1797. '' Leonaurs, 2011.. * Dupijs, Rodžers. '' La période jacobine: terreur, guerre et gouvernement révolutionnaire: 1792 & ndash1794 '', Parīze, Seula, 2005. * Ersch, Johann Samuel
'' Allgemeine enciklopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer folge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben ''
Leipciga, J. F. Gledičs, 1889. *Geitss, Dāvids. '' Napoleona kari 1803. -1815. '', Ņujorka, Random House, 2011. *Greiems, Tomass, barons Linedoks
'' 1796. gada kampaņas vēsture Vācijā un Itālijā. ''
Londona, 1797. gads. * Haythornthwaite, Filips. '' Napoleona karu Austrijas armija (1): kājnieki. '' Izdevniecība Osprey, 2012. * Huot, Paul. '' Des Vosges au Rhin, excursions et causeries alsaciennes, '' Veuve Berger-Levrault & Fils, Parīze, 1868. * Phipps, Ramsay Weston. '' Pirmās Francijas Republikas armijas: II sējums Armēes du Moselle, du Rhin, de Sambre-et-Meuse, de Rhin-et-Mozelle ''. ASV: Pickle Partners Publishing 2011. gada oriģinālizdevuma atkārtota izdrukāšana 1920. – 32. * Rikards, Dž
'' Emendingenas kauja ''
Kara vēsture
2009. gada 17. februāris. Skatīts 2014. gada 18. novembrī. *Rothenburg, Gunther. "Habsburgu armija Napoleona karos (1792–1815)". '' Militārās lietas, '' 37: 1 (1973. gada februāris), 1. – 5. *Schroeder, Paul W. '' Transformation of Europe, 1763–1848 '', Clarendon, 1996, 2. – 3. * Smits, Digbijs. '' Napoleona karu datu grāmata. '' Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1999. * Wurzbach, Constant von. '' Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich '' 53. Vīne, 1886. *Vann, James Allen. '' Švābu kreis: institucionālā izaugsme Svētās Romas impērijā 1648–1715. '' Sēj. LII, Pētījumi, kas iesniegti Starptautiskajai pārstāvniecības un parlamentāro institūciju vēstures komisijai. Bruxelles, 1975. *Walker, Mack. '' Vācijas dzimtās pilsētas: kopiena, valsts un ģenerālīpašums, 1648–1871. '' Ithaka, 1998. <

Saturs ir Copyleft
Tīmekļa vietnes dizains, kods un mākslīgais intelekts (Stephen Payne) ir c) 2014. – 2017. Gada autortiesības


Amerikāņi sakauj britus Jorktaunā

Britu ģenerālis lords Kornvoliss, kurš ir bezcerīgi iesprostots Jorktaunā, Virdžīnijā, nodod 8000 britu karavīru un jūrnieku lielākiem franču-amerikāņu spēkiem, tādējādi faktiski izbeidzot Amerikas revolūciju.

Lords Kornvaliss bija viens no spējīgākajiem britu ģenerāļiem Amerikas revolūcijā. 1776. gadā viņš padzina ģenerāļa Džordža Vašingtonas un Patriotu spēkus no Ņūdžersijas, un 1780. gadā Kamdenā, Dienvidkarolīnā, izcīnīja satriecošu uzvaru pār ģenerāļa Horatio Geitsa un#x2019 Patriotu armiju. Tomēr Kornvolisa iebrukums Ziemeļkarolīnā nebija tik veiksmīgs, un 1781. gada aprīlī viņš noveda savu nogurušo un sabojāto karaspēku uz Virdžīnijas piekrasti, kur Ņujorkā varēja uzturēt jūras sakaru līnijas ar lielo britu ģenerāļa Henrija Klintona armiju. Pilsēta. Pēc virknes reidu pret pilsētām un plantācijām Virdžīnijā Kornvalisa augustā apmetās plūdmaiņu pilsētā Jorktaunā. The British immediately began fortifying the town and the adjacent promontory of Gloucester Point across the York River.

General George Washington instructed the Marquis de Lafayette, who was in Virginia with an American army of around 5,000 men, to block Cornwallis’ escape from Yorktown by land. In the meantime, Washington’s 2,500 troops in New York were joined by a French army of 4,000 men under the Count de Rochambeau. Washington and Rochambeau made plans to attack Cornwallis with the assistance of a large French fleet under the Count de Grasse, and on August 21 they crossed the Hudson River to march south to Yorktown. Covering 200 miles in 15 days, the allied force reached the head of Chesapeake Bay in early September.

Meanwhile, a British fleet under Admiral Thomas Graves failed to break French naval superiority at the Battle of Virginia Capes on September 5, denying Cornwallis his expected reinforcements. Beginning September 14, de Grasse transported Washington and Rochambeau’s men down the Chesapeake to Virginia, where they joined Lafayette and completed the encirclement of Yorktown on September 28. De Grasse landed another 3,000 French troops carried by his fleet. During the first two weeks of October, the 14,000 Franco-American troops gradually overcame the fortified British positions with the aid of de Grasse’s warships. A large British fleet carrying 7,000 men set out to rescue Cornwallis, but it was too late.

On October 19, General Cornwallis surrendered 7,087 officers and men, 900 seamen, 144 cannons, 15 galleys, a frigate, and 30 transport ships. Pleading illness, he did not attend the surrender ceremony, but his second-in-command, General Charles O’Hara, carried Cornwallis’ sword to the American and French commanders. As the British and Hessian troops marched out to surrender, the British bands played the song “The World Turned Upside Down.”

Although the war persisted on the high seas and in other theaters, the Patriot victory at Yorktown effectively ended fighting in the American colonies. Peace negotiations began in 1782, and on September 3, 1783, the Treaty of Paris was signed, formally recognizing the United States as a free and independent nation after eight years of war.


Stock markets have the largest-ever one-day crash on "Black Monday"

The largest-ever one-day percentage decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average comes not in 1929 but on October 19, 1987. As a number of unrelated events conspired to tank global markets, the Dow dropped 508 points�.6 percent—in a panic that foreshadowed larger systemic issues.

Confidence on Wall Street had grown throughout the 1980s as the economy pulled out of a slump and President Ronald Reagan implemented business-friendly policies. In October 1987, however, indicators began to suggest that the bull market of the last five years was coming to an end. The government reported a surprisingly large trade deficit, precipitating a decline in the U.S. Dollar. Congress revealed it was considering closing tax loopholes for corporate mergers, worrying investors who were used to loose regulation.

As these concerns grew, Iran attacked two oil tankers off of Kuwait and a freak storm paralyzed England, closing British markets early on the Friday before the crash. The following Monday, U.S. investors awoke to news of turmoil in Asian and European markets, and the Dow began to tumble.

Further compounding the crash was the practice of program trading, the programming of computers to automatically execute trades under certain conditions. Once the rush to sell began, matters were quite literally out of traders’ hands and machines escalated the damage to the market.

Despite looking like the beginning of another Great Depression—the L.A. Times’ headline read �lam on Wall St.” while the Ņujorkas dienas ziņas’ simply read “PANIC!,” Black Monday has been largely forgotten by Americans not versed in financial history. As it would again in 2008, the federal government took a number of measures to 𠇌orrect” the market, resulting in immediate gains over the next few weeks. By 1989, the market appeared to have made a full recovery. 

Some now interpret the events surrounding Black Monday as proof that boom-and-bust cycles are natural and healthy aspects of modern economics, while others believe it was a missed opportunity to examine and regulate the kind of risky behaviors that led to the crash of 2008.


“Take on Me” music video helps Norway’s A-ha reach the top the U.S. pop charts

From its beginnings in the early 1980s, it was clear that MTV, the Music Television Network, would have a dramatic effect on the way pop stars marketed their music and themselves. While radio remained a necessary engine to drive the sales and chart rankings of singles and albums, the rise of new artists like Duran Duran and the further ascent of established stars like Michael Jackson showed that creativity and esthetic appeal on MTV could make a direct and undeniable contribution to a musical performer’s commercial success. But if ever a case existed in which MTV did more than just contribute to an act’s success, it was the case of the Norwegian band a-Ha, who went from total unknowns to chart-topping pop stars almost solely on the strength of the groundbreaking video for the song “Take On Me,” which hit #1 on the Stends pop chart on October 19, 1985.

By 1985 the medium was established enough that it took a unique angle to achieve music video stardom. Enter a-Ha, a synth-pop group that caught a late ride on the dying New Wave thanks to the video for “Take On Me,” in which lead singer Morten Harket was transformed using a decades-old technology called Rotoscoping. The creators of the “Take On Me” video painted portions or sometimes the entirety of individual frames to create the effect of a dashingly handsome comic-book motorcycle racer (Harket) romancing a pretty girl from the real world, fighting off a gang of angry pursuers in a pipe-wrench fight before bursting out of the comic-book world as a dashingly handsome real boy.


A Forgotten Army The Irish Yeomanry

‘Peep O’Day Boys’, from Daly’s Ireland in 󈨦(1888). Despite the title the uniforms suggest that villians in the picture are Yeomanry, a reflection of their notoriety in folk memory.

In September 1796, Ireland was pregnant with expectation. The United Irishmen and Defenders planned insurrection and a French invasion was imminent. On 19 September Dublin Castle announced plans to follow Britain’s lead and enlist civilian volunteers as a yeomanry force. In October commissions were issued to local gentlemen and magistrates empowering them to raise cavalry troops and infantry companies. Recruits took the ‘Yeomanry oath’, were officered by the local gentry but were paid, clothed, armed and controlled by government. Their remit was to free the regular army and militia from domestic peacekeeping and do garrison duty if invasion meant troops had to move
to the coast. Service was part-time—usually two ‘exercise days’ per week—except during emergencies when they were called up on ‘permanent duty’.

Folk memory

If the Irish Yeomanry are remembered at all it is usually for their notoriety in the bloody summer of 1798. The popular folk memory of every area which saw action supplies lurid stories from the burning of Father John Murphy’s corpse in a tar barrel at Tullow to the sabreing and mutilation of Betsy Gray after the battle of Ballynahinch. Until recently, the Yeomen have been largely written out of history, apart from early nineteenth century polemics where they appear either as a brutal mob making ‘croppies’ lie down or latter day Williamite saviours. Such neglect belies the Irish Yeomanry’s real significance.
When Belfast’s White Linen Hall was demolished in 1896 to make way for City Hall a glass phial containing a scroll bearing Volunteer reform resolutions was found in its foundations. Two years later another demolition occurred. Ballynahinch loyalists smashed the monument on Betsy Gray’s grave to prevent a 1798 centenary celebration by Belfast Home Rulers. Volunteer radicalism was hermetically sealed in the past while the passions and polarisation engendered in the later 1790s lived and breathed. The Irish Yeomanry played a key role in this critical transition which saw ancient antipathies sharpen and re-assert their baleful influence after a period of relative calm. The ‘Age of Reason’ had briefly promised a brave new world in Ireland. In the 1780s, radical Volunteers favoured Catholic relief along with parliamentary reform. The Boyne Societies, founded to perpetuate the Williamite cause, charged toasting glasses rather than muskets. However the prospect of revolutionary change proved too much to swallow.

Flag of the Lower lveagh Yeoman Cavalry.
(Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

The force raised in 1796 actually bore much more resemblance to the Volunteers, praised by United Irish writers Myles Byrne and Charles Teeling, than to the reactionary and bigoted organisation portrayed in their rebellion histories. In reality, loyalism in 1796 was still a relatively broad church containing an ideological diversity and fluidity reminiscent of Volunteering days. Indeed, the Yeomanry were largely based on the same membership constituency, with frequent continuity of individual or family service. They certainly included the Williamite tradition found in some Volunteer corps but it also encompassed much of the democratic and indeed radical volunteering spirit. Election of officers was common everywhere. Dublin Yeomen, whom Henry Joy McCracken thought ‘liberal’, also elected their captains despite governmental opposition. Even in Armagh, the cockpit of Orangeism, Yeomen varied from Diamond veterans in the Crowhill infantry to radical ex-Volunteers enrolled by Lord Charlemont despite quibbles over the oath and the inclusion of some erstwhile francophiles who had recently erected a liberty tree.
In 1796, there was no inconsistency about this. Grattan dubbed the Yeomanry ‘an ascendancy army’ but in reality the United Irishmen were in the ascendant while the loyalist response was fragmented and in danger of being overwhelmed. The initial priority was defence: to trawl in all varieties of loyalty and provide a structure to prevent people being neutralised or becoming United Irishmen.

More Catholics than Orangemen

The new Yeomanry was therefore a surprisingly diverse force, given its subsequent reputation. The government denied any intention of excluding Catholics or Presbyterians but the system already had the potential for denominational

and ideological filtering. Being a Yeoman was a desirable position conveying social status plus pay, clothing, arms and training. Applications exceeded places, which were limited by financial and security considerations. This meant selection locally and government reliance on local landowners’ judgement.
Sometimes recruits had no choice. In some areas only Protestants volunteered, in others the Catholic Committee sabotaged Catholic enlistment. In Loughinsholin, where Presbyterians offered Catholics withdrew and vice-versa. Where there was competition to enter a limited number of corps, choices were unavoidable. Downshire allowed Catholics in his cavalry but faced mutually exclusive Protestant and Catholic infantry offers from the same parishes and opted for the former. In Orange areas, some landowners deliberately selected their Yeomen directly from the local lodge. Occasionally a precarious balance was attempted by including proportions of Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter. The Farney corps in Monaghan started this way. However the first levy produced a predominantly Anglican force. There were Presbyterian Yeomen in mid-Ulster but the strength of the United Irishmen in eastern counties meant relatively few corps were raised there in 1796.
Wealthy, property-owning Catholics, on the other hand, were admitted into cavalry corps. There was an element of tokenism in this: Yeomanry offers of service sometimes highlighted Catholic members, which they never did for the Protestant denominations. In this way it can be estimated that at the very least ten per cent of the first national levy of 20,000 Yeomen were Catholic, thus outnumbering the Orange yeomen who in 1796 were only to be found in some corps in the Orange districts of mid-Ulster.
Forming a Yeomanry force in the deteriorating conditions of 1796 gave the initiative briefly back to Dublin Castle but this disappeared in the crisis following the Bantry Bay invasion attempt. The United Irishmen drew great encouragement from its near success and felt themselves strong enough to switch their policy on the Yeomanry from intimidation to infiltration. As a response, purges of Yeomanry corps began in Ulster and Leinster in the spring of 1797.

Orange links

Many Catholics were expelled from corps in Wicklow and Wexford on suspicion of being ‘United’. In mid-Ulster General John Knox devised a ‘test oath’ obliging Yeomen to publicly swear they were not United Irishmen. This got results and several corps were cleared of disaffected members. The Presbyterian secretary of the Farney corps was expelled following his confession of United Irish membership while Catholics were removed on the pretext of a political resolution they had issued. Knox followed up the expulsions by permitting augmentations of Orangemen into some northern corps. Although Orangemen quietly joined some corps in 1796 this was the first time they had official approval.
Knox clinched this by engineering Orange resolutions for Castle consumption. This was a risky strategy, given the recent disturbances in Armagh. Knox, a correspondent of the radical MP Arthur O’Connor, privately disapproved of Orangeism but believed the dangerous predicament he faced merited utilising it as a short-term expedient. However, with the United Irish-Defender alliance growing, the precedent inherent in this strategy would have profound and lasting consequences. Almost immediately, symptoms of polarisation appeared. A Tyrone clergyman noted approvingly, ‘Our parties are all obviously merged into two: loyalists and traitors’.

Castlereagh’s secret policy

However the critical Yeomanry-Orange connection was still to come. By 1798 Orangeism had been adopted by many northern gentry and spread to Dublin where a framework national organisation was established. As insurrection loomed, this provided a ready-made supply of loyal manpower. There were around 18,000 Yeomen in Ulster whereas the Orangemen were conservatively reckoned at 40,000. In March the Dublin leaders offered the Ulster Orangemen to the government if it would arm them. The viceroy, Camden, was scared of offending Catholics in the Militia and hestitated. However, the appointment of an Irishman—Lord Castlereagh—as acting chief secretary offered a solution. On 16 April 1798 he ordered northern Yeomanry commanders to organise 5,000 ‘supplementary’ men to be armed in an emergency. Camden and Castlereagh had privately decided that, where possible, these would be Orangemen.
In tandem with the supplementary plan, regular Yeomen were given a more military role. They were put on permanent duty and integrated into contingency plans for garrisoning key towns at the outbreak of trouble. This had one very important side-effect. In the cramped conditions of garrison life and the panic occasioned by the influx of rural loyalists, Orangeism spread like wildfire amongst both Yeomanry and regular units. This spontaneous, ground-level spread of Orangeism operated simultaneously with Castlereagh’s secret emergency policy to utilise Orange manpower in Ulster. The Yeomanry system proved the ideal facilitator for both.

Drum of the Aughnahoe[County Tyrone] Yeoman Infantry. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

On 1 July 1798 in the Presbyterian town of Belfast, once the epicentre of United Irish activity, it was noted that ‘Every man…has a red coat on’. This would have been inconceivable in 1796 when there was great difficulty enlisting Yeomen. However, it was now government policy to separate northern Presbyterians from the United Irishmen. Again the Yeomanry played a key role. Castlereagh admitted privately that the arrest of the Down United colonel, William Steel Dickson was an exception to ‘the policy of acting against the Catholick [sic] rather than the Presbyterian members of the union [United Irishmen]’. Government supporters industriously spread news of the Scullabogue massacre (See HI Autumn 1996) to stir up atavistic fears. The Yeomanry was expanded considerably to meet the emergency and ex-radicals were no longer discouraged. In effect, the Yeomanry functioned as a safety net. Joining up offered an acceptable and very public ‘way back’ for wavering radicals. Although there were some Presbyterian Yeomen in 1796, many more joined in mid-1798. Charlemont’s friend, the Anglican clergyman Edward Hudson, exploited a ‘schism’ between Presbyterian and Catholic to enlist the former in his Portglenone corps, sardonically noting ‘the brotherhood of affection is over’. By 1799, he claimed ‘the word “Protestant”, which was becoming obsolete in the north, has regained its influence and all of that description seem drawing closer together’. Thus the Yeomanry oath was often a rite of passage for Presbyterians keen to end their flirtation with revolution.

The 1798 rebellion had a profound impact on the psyche of Protestant Ireland, conjuring up anew spectres of 1641. When news of the rising hit Dublin, Camden described the apocalyptic atmosphere to Pitt. The rebellion

literally made the Protestant part of this country mad…it is scarcely possible to restrain the violence of my own immediate friends and advisors…they are prepared for extirpation and any appearance of lenity…raises a flame which runs like wildfire thro’ the streets.

Mercy was indeed scarce until Cornwallis replaced Camden and the rebellion was effectively crushed. Up to this juncture, the interests of most Protestants and the government were running parallel, a partnership potently symbolised by the Yeomanry, now blooded in the rebellion. Many embattled Protestants saw the parallel interests as identical: through the smouldering fires of rebellion they confused expediency with permanent policy.
Cornwallis, a professional soldier, voiced his contempt for the barbarity of the local amateur forces, particularly the Yeomanry. For many, criticism of the Yeomanry was construed as attacking Protestant interests. Yeomanry service under Camden and the relationship it represented was now seen as an unalterable ‘gold standard’. When government policy ran counter to perceived Protestant interests, loyalty was qualified with distrust and a feeling of betrayal. Camden was toasted as ‘the father of the Yeomanry’ while Cornwallis was lampooned as ‘Croppywallis’.

Lt. Col. William Blacker, Yeoman and Oraneman
(Dublin University Magazine 1841)

The Yeomanry and the Union

When it emerged that Pitt intended legislative union, antagonism towards Cornwallis sharpened. As union would remove emancipation from Ireland’s control, ultra-Protestant loyalty faced a severe test. Many Yeomen and Orangemen opposed the measure, particularly in Dublin where lawyers and merchants also faced a loss of professional and mercantile status. The Yeomanry, which it was claimed saved Ireland in 1798, were at the cutting edge of the anti-union campaign. A mutiny was threatened in Dublin with Volunteer-type rhetoric, but the bluster of 1782 proved hot air in post-rebellion Ireland. In the last analysis Protestants depended on the Yeomanry and the Yeomen depended on the government. The consequences of disbandment made union seem the lesser evil. Cornwallis rushed reinforcements to Dublin but the bluff had called itself.
Jonah Barrington later claimed the Volunteers were loyal to their country [Ireland] and their king while the Yeomen looked to ‘the king of England and his ministers’. Barrington’s jibe about patriotism was the peevish reaction of an incorrigible anti-unionist, yet a subtle alteration in the nature and focus of loyalty had occurred. The Volunteers’ ‘patriotism’ flourished in an atmosphere where they faced no real internal threat. While many Yeomen opposed the abolition of the Irish parliament, the experience of 1798 made challenging the executive a luxury they could not afford. On the surface, the switch of loyalty from College Green to Dublin Castle seemed relatively smooth: Yeomanry corps quickly adopted the post-1800 union flag in their colours. Yet, alongside this, a new focus of loyalty emerged to co-exist with this sometimes grudging allegiance. The ‘Protestant nationalism’ of 1782 was transformed into a clenching loyalty to the increasingly insecure interests of Irish Protestants.

Politicisation and Protestantism

The Yeomanry soon became a major component in post-union politics, a conduit between government and substantial numbers of Protestants who increasingly saw the force as symbolising the survival of their social and political position. They functioned as a political tool. When Hardwicke, the new viceroy, wanted to send a conciliatory message to nervous Protestants he reviewed the entire Dublin Yeomanry in Phoenix Park, then lavished hospitality on the officers in a banquet afterwards. It was a two-way process: Protestants could use the Yeomanry to put government in their debt. The continuance of war in 1803 meant a large increase in the Yeomanry from 63,000 to around 80,000. Emmet’s rising, coming when this augmentation was on foot, gave Protestants another opportunity to appear indispensable by extending their monopoly of the Yeomanry. The means by which this was accomplished ranged from high-level manoeuvring to parish pump politics.
As a partisan Yeomanry would be viewed in a poor light at Westminster, Hardwicke attempted a balance by considering some purely Catholic corps. However the Louth MP Fortesque threatened impeachment if he proceeded. Even the chief secretary, Wickham, considered Catholic corps ‘unsafe’ as they would inflame loyalist opinion and ‘be not cried but roared out against throughout all Ireland’. At a local level, Arthur Browne, the Prime Sergeant of Limerick, observed that Yeomanry corps in each town he passed on circuit effectively excluded Catholics by submitting prospective recruits to a ballot of existing members. This said, the Protestant monopoly was never total. Catholic Yeomen remained in areas of sparse Protestant settlement like Kerry. Moreover, there was still a scattering of liberal Protestants, usually at officer level, like Lieutenant Barnes of the Armagh Yeomanry. However, the general tendency was clear. When it became known Barnes had signed an emancipation petition, the privates mutinied and flung down their arms.

In the early nineteenth century, the passions generated by 1798 mixed with the politics of the Catholic Question. The continued existence of the Yeomanry allowed Protestants to demonstrate that their traditional control of law and order was intact as the campaign for emancipation built up. Yeomanry parades and the use of the force in assisting magistrates with mundane law and order matters assumed great symbolic importance as tangible manifestations of the fractures in Irish society. Yeomanry corps inevitably became involved in local clashes in an increasingly sectarianised atmosphere. In 1807, the government prevented Enniscorthy Yeomen celebrating the anniversary of the battle of Vinegar Hill as it raised sectarian tensions. In 1808 Yeomen were among a mob which disrupted a St John’s Eve bonfire and ‘garland’ near Newry, provoking a riot in which one man died. During the disturbances which swept Kerry and Limerick the same year, isolated Protestant Yeomen were singled out for attacks and arms raids. Since penal times, possession or dispossession of arms scored political points. Protestant insecurity and Catholic alienation fed off each other. O’Connell, ironically once a Yeoman himself, upped the ante by lambasting the force as symbolising a partisan magistracy.
The Yeomanry presented governments with a dilemma: was their strategic utility worth the political price? While war with France continued and the regular army was depleted for overseas service, they provided an important source of additional manpower and were particularly useful during invasion scares when they could free up the remaining regular garrison and maintain a local presence to deter co-ordinated action by the disaffected. Moreover, they served an unofficial purpose by keeping potentially turbulent Protestants under discipline.
The decision was deferred and the dilemma submerged. For much of the 1820s the Yeomanry lingered on, a rather moribund force seen by officials as a liability which could not be disbanded for fear of a Protestant reaction, particularly in Ulster where the force was numerically strongest. The advent of the denominationally inclusive County Constabulary in 1822 further touched Protestant insecurity by removing much of the functional justification for Yeomanry. There was no love lost between the two forces. In 1830 William McMullan of the Lurgan infantry was arrested by his own captain, yelling at the head of a mob rioting against the police, ‘we have plenty of arms and ammunition and can use them as well as you’. Ironically in that year the Whig chief secretary, Stanley, had decided to re-clothe and re-arm the Yeomanry as part of the response to the southern Tithe War. Stanley’s experiment proved disastrous as sectarian clashes developed.
In some districts the sight of a red coat was like a red rag to a bull. In 1831, the rescue of two heifers destrained for tithe sparked an appalling incident in Newtownbarry. A mob of locals tried to release the cattle, the magistrates called for Yeomanry and stones were thrown. When one Yeoman fell with a fractured skull, the others opened fire killing fourteen countrymen. The viceroy, Anglesey, tried to limit the political damage by initiating a progressive dismantling of the Yeomanry starting with a stand-down of the permanent sergeants which meant the Yeomen could no longer drill. This phasing-out took three years and was intentionally gradual, starving the Yeomanry of the oxygen of duty and pay, thus letting them pass away naturally if not gracefully. It was rightly felt this approach would be less likely to provoke a political reaction than sudden disbandment which, for a Protestant community coming to terms with emancipation, would have been like an amputation without anaesthetic.

Yeomanry belt plates – Glenauly [County Fermanagh]
Infantry and Belfast Merchant’s Crops. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

Although the Yeomanry’s official existence ended in 1834, the last rusty muskets were not removed from their dusty stores till the early 1840s. With unintentional but obvious symbolism, they were escorted to the ordnance stores by members of the new constabulary. Although gone, the Yeomen were most certainly not forgotten. For one thing, they were seen as the most recent manifestation of a tradition of Protestant self-defence stretching back to plantation requirements of armed service from tenants then re-surfacing in different forms such as the Williamite county associations, the eighteenth-century Boyne Societies, anti-Jacobite associations of 1745 and the Volunteers. Such identification had been eagerly promoted. At the foundation of an Apprentice Boys’ club in 1813, Colonel Blacker, a Yeoman and Orangeman, amalgamated the siege tradition, the Yeomanry and 1798 in a song entitled The Crimson Banner:

Again when treason maddened round,
and rebel hordes were swarming,
were Derry’s sons the foremost found,
for King and Country arming.

Moreover, the idea of a yeomanry remained as a structural template for local, gentry-led self-defence, particularly in Ulster. When volunteering was revived in Britain in 1859, northern Irish MPs like Sharman Crawford tried unsuccessfully to use the Yeomanry precedent to get similar Irish legislation. Yeomanry-like associations were mooted in the second Home Rule crisis of 1893. The Ulster Volunteer Force of 1911-14—often led by the same families like Knox of Dungannon—defined their role like Yeomen, giving priority to local defence and exhibiting great reluctance to leave their own districts for training in brigades.
The strong Orange-Yeomanry connection—itself part of a wider process of militarisation in Irish society—has left an enduring imprint on Orangeism which can be seen in the marching fife and drum bands and in various military regalia such as ceremonial swords and pikes. Even the name is still retained by the Moira Yeomanry Loyal Orange Lodge. The town or parish basis of Yeomanry corps mirrored the dynamics of the plantations and helped catapult the territorial mind-set of both ‘planter’ and ‘native’ into the nineteenth century and beyond. Weekly Yeomanry parades defined territory in the same way as rural drumming parties in the nineteenth century and marches, murals and coloured kerbstones in the twentieth.

Alan Blackstock works in the Public Records Office, Northern Ireland.

The formation of the Orange Order, 1795-98: the edited papers of Colonel William Blacker and Colonel Robert H. Wallace (Belfast 1994).

T. Bartlett, The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation (Dublin 1992).

G. Broeker, Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-36 (London 1970).

H. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 1795-1836 (London and Toronto 1966).


Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796 - History

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Izmērs 1.0 feet of linear shelf space (approximately 372 items)
Anotācija Edmund Walter Jones (1811-1876) was a planter at Clover Hill in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Early items in the collection are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law, William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport (b. 1839), John Thomas (1842-1864) and Walter L. (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator. Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.
Radītājs Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
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  • Avery family.
  • Bounties, Military--United States--History--Mexican War, 1846-1848.
  • Clover Hill Plantation (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • College students--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Amerikas Savienotās Valstis. Army--Military life.
  • Amerikas Savienotās Valstis. Army. North Carolina Infantry Regiment, 26th.
  • Davenport, William, fl. 1789-1821.
  • Family--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Happy Valley (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • Jones family.
  • Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1771-1844.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1848-1920.
  • Jones, John Thomas, 1842-1864.
  • Jones, Walter L., d. 1863. gads.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Lawyers--North Carolina--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir (N.C.)--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir family.
  • North Carolina--Boundaries--Tennessee.
  • North Carolina--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.
  • North Carolina--Politics and government--1865-1950.
  • Patterson family.
  • Plantations--North Carolina--Caldwell County.
  • Real estate investment--United States--History--19th century.
  • Soldiers--Confederate States of America--Correspondence.
  • Southern States--Description and travel.
  • Surveyors--North Carolina--History.
  • Tennessee--Boundaries--North Carolina.
  • University of North Carolina (1793-1962)--Students--History--19th century.
  • Virginia--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.

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Edmund Walter Jones of Clover Hill, situated about six miles north of Lenoir in Caldwell County, N.C., was the son of Edmund Jones and his wife Ann Lenoir Jones of Palmyra. His grandfathers were William Lenoir and George Jones. Edmund Walter Jones married his cousin Sophia Caroline Davenport, daughter of William Davenport and his wife Mary Lenoir Gordon Davenport of The Fountain (or Walnut Fountain). All of these homes were located in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Edmund Walter and Sophia Jones had four sons and one daughter: Colonel John T. Jones, who was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness on 6 May 1864 Private Walter L. Jones, who was mortally wounded at Gettysburg Captain William Davenport Jones, a member of General Collet Leventhorpe's staff who was also wounded and Edmund Jones, legislator and lawyer. Colonel John Thomas Jones served in the 1st North Carolina Volunteers and then as an officer in the 26th North Carolina Regiment under Zebulon B. Vance and Henry K. Burgwyn, and in the brigade of James Johnston Pettigrew. He was a lieutenant colonel when he was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness. Walter L. Jones attended Hillsboro Military Academy in 1860, became a soldier, and was killed at Gettysburg. Edmund Jones (1848-1920), called Edmund Jones, Jr. and nicknamed Coot, studied at Bingham Academy, served briefly in the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry in 1865, and after the war studied at the University of North Carolina and the University of Virginia. In later years, he farmed at Clover Hill, practiced law in Lenoir, and served in the N.C. legislature.

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The earlier papers are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest and wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport Jones, John Thomas Jones (1842-1864) and Walter L. Jones (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund Jones (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, N.C., lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator.

Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill Plantation and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.


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